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1 
A SUMMARY OF CONTRADICTIONS: AN 
OUTLINE OF THE EU’S MAIN INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL APPROACHES TO ETHNIC 
MINORITY PROTECTION 
Dimitry Kochenov* 
Liberty has always been understood in Europe as the freedom to be our real 
selves. 
—José Ortega y Gasset1 
Abstract: A number of available legal instruments have the potential to 
contribute to the elaboration of an EU minority protection standard. 
These instruments, however, are mostly limited to guaranteeing simple 
nondiscrimination, which is not enough to ensure minority protection 
stricto sensu. The lack of any viable internal minority protection standard 
did not prevent the European Union from treating minority protection 
as one of the key elements of the pre-accession process leading to the 
Eastern enlargement, reinforcing the internal-external competence di-
vide and reducing the effectiveness of minority protection in the Euro-
pean Union. Although minority protection was one of the Copenhagen 
political criteria—and thus at the core of the conditionality principle 
presupposing a fair assessment of the candidate countries’ progress on 
the merits—the Commission clearly used minority protection in a dis-
criminatory way, tolerating the standard of assimilation in one group of 
candidate countries (Latvia, Estonia) and backing cultural autonomy in 
others. Thus, alongside the internal toleration or simple denial of mi-
nority problems in the European Union, the Commission simultaneously 
promoted two contradicting approaches in external relations: de facto as-
similation, which is prohibited by article 5(2) of the Framework Con-
vention for the Protection of National Minorities, and cultural auton-
omy, which brings to life a complicated web of partly overlapping, partly 
contradicting standards. 
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Gabriel N. von Toggenburg, who read the drafts of this article at different stages of com-
pletion. All mistakes and omissions remain mine. 
1 José Ortega y Gasset, Toward a Philosophy of History 57 (1940). 
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Introduction: An Edifice of Many Contradictions 
 “Stubbornly thinking in symbols”: this is how a Czech mayor, busy 
with building a Roma ghetto in the town of Ústí nad Labem, charac-
terized the European Union (EU).2 The mayor in question is not the 
only person in Central and Eastern Europe to ascribe equality, non-
discrimination, and human rights protection only a “symbolic” value. 
Luckily, the European integration project is largely built around a set 
of values quite different from the local prejudices found in Member 
States and candidate countries. Minority protection is one of those 
principles, vital for the successful creation of a Union based on de-
mocracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. 
 The articulation of the pre-accession principle of conditionality3 
during the preparation of the Eastern enlargement of the European 
Union4 provided the organization with a number of tools of influence 
necessary to effectively alter the situation of minority protection in 
the candidate countries and other states willing to accede.5 Such de-
velopments notwithstanding, the fact that the European Commission 
(Commission) has honored the minority protection criterion with 
unprecedented attention surprised a number of academics.6 
                                                                                                                      
2 Edo Banach, The Roma and the Native Americans: Encapsulated Communities Within Lar-
ger Constitutional Regimes, 14 Fla. J. Int’l L. 353, 382 (2002). 
3 The essence of the principle of conditionality was to make the accession of the candi-
date countries to the European Union conditional on a number of preconditions spelled out 
by the Commission. An elaborate system of legal and political instruments was used to check 
the candidate countries’ compliance with the preconditions formulated. See Dimitry Ko-
chenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Condi-
tionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law, Ch. 2 (2008). 
4 The fifth enlargement round accommodated Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slo-
vakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic. See Treaty Concerning 
the Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union, 2003 O.J. (L 235) 17. The sixth enlargement round accommodated 
Romania and Bulgaria. See Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria 
and Romania to the European Union, 2005 O.J. (L 157) 11. 
5 See Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty—
Custom Concubinage?, 9 Eur. Integration Online Papers 1, 28 n.2 (2005), http://eiop. 
or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop (providing an exhaustive list of such tools of influence). See 
generally EU Enlargement (Christophe Hillion ed., 2004) [hereinafter EU Enlarge-
ment]; Handbook on European Enlargement (Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis eds., 2002). 
6 See, e.g., Marc Maresceau, The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: A Political and Legal Analysis, 
in The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies 3, 16 (Marc Maresceau & 
Erwan Lannon eds., 2001). 
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 Academics were astonished because minority protection as such 
lies outside the scope of the acquis communautaire.7 However, given a 
goal-oriented reading of articles 49 and 6(1) of the European Union 
Treaty (EU Treaty) in light of article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (EC Treaty), the Commission’s activities during 
the pre-accession process were not constrained by article 5 of the EC 
Treaty’s competence limitations because only checking the candidates’ 
adherence to the “democracy, the Rule of Law and human rights”8 is-
sues falling within the scope of the acquis would contradict the very 
purpose of article 6(1) of the EU Treaty, which clearly has an over-
whelming scope, not restricted by Community competence limitations. 
Thus it is not surprising that minority protection, along with other is-
sues generally falling outside the scope of the acquis, became one of the 
corner-stones of the pre-accession. Ethnic minority protection is not 
the only example of such practice—the rights of sexual minorities, for 
instance, have been included by the Commission into the pre-accession 
assessment even though the acquis did not include any Community 
competence on this issue at the time when regular reporting had 
started9 and the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was 
rather hostile to EU citizens belonging to sexual minorities.10 
 Judging by the reports and opinions released by the Commission 
during the preparation of the eastern enlargement, it can be con-
cluded that minority protection was at the core of the pre-accession 
process. Sections of the Copenhagen-related documents11 concerning 
the assessment of this criterion are considerably longer than the sec-
tions concerning other issues. The analysis contained therein covered a 
large number of minority protection issues. Reports concerning some 
countries even adopted a unique sub-structure of the minority protec-
                                                                                                                      
7 Christine Delcourt, The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept Had Its Day?, 38 
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 829, 830 (2001) (noting that acquis communautaire includes whole 
body of legal instruments in force in European Union). 
8 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council ( June 21–22, 1993). For 
general information on the Copenhagen Criteria, see generally Christophe Hillion, The 
Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny, in EU Enlargement, supra note 5, at 1. 
9 See, e.g., Written Question No. 2224/96, 1996 O.J. (C 365) 95; Written Question No. 
2134/83, 1984 O.J. (C 152) 25; Written Question No. 2126/83, 1984 O.J. (C 173) 9. 
10 See Case C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-
621. 
11 See generally Dimitry Kochenov, Behind the Copenhagen Façade: The Meaning and Struc-
ture of the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 8 Eur. Integration 
Online Papers 5–8 (2004), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop (describing structure 
of whole body of Copenhagen-related documents including those released in implementa-
tion of conditionality principle of Copenhagen criteria). 
4 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:1 
tion section, something the Commission did not do while addressing 
other issues. 
 Such an approach to minority protection can be regarded as a 
logical response to the rise of nationalism in Central and Eastern 
European countries, and is clearly connected with the European Un-
ion’s stability and security concerns.12 Although it has been argued 
that “nationalism is an inevitable factor in the creation of the post-
communist state,”13 not all scholars share this view.14 At the same time, 
it is impossible to deny that historically, minority protection has always 
been especially acute for Central and Eastern European countries.15 
This was particularly true during the interbellum period between the 
two world wars, when the dissolution of several empires and the crea-
tion of new nation states shifted borders and gave rise to a number of 
minority problems all over the region. 
 The prominent role played by minority protection during the 
pre-accession process leading to the last enlargement did not result in 
(and was not based on) elaboration of any serious minority protection 
standard that the European Union could use both internally and ex-
ternally, especially during the preparation of the coming enlarge-
ments. Such a standard will be needed in the future because the 
                                                                                                                      
12 For discussion of the role played by the respect for and the protection of minorities 
in the Copenhagen criteria in the preparation of the fifth enlargement, see generally J.W. 
van der Meulen, Bescherming van minderheden als criterium bij EU-uitbreiding: 
de Europese Commissie en Midden-Europa (2003) Kristen Henrard, The Impact of the 
Enlargement Process on the Development of a Minority Protection Policy Within the EU: Another As-
pect of Responsibility/Burden-Sharing?, 9 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 357 (2002); Chris-
tophe Hillion, Enlargement of the EU—The Discrepancy Between Membership Obligations and 
Accession Conditions as Regards the Protection of Minorities, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 715 (2004); 
Gwendolyn Sasse, Minority Rights and EU Enlargement: Normative Overstretch of Effective Condi-
tionality?, in Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union (Gabriel von 
Toggenburg ed., 2004) [hereinafter Enlarged European Union]; James Hughes & 
Gwendolyn Sasse, Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protec-
tion in the CEECs, 1 J. Ethnopolitics & Minority Issues in Eur. (2003), http://ecmi.de/ 
jemie/download/Focus1-2003_Hughes_Sasse.pdf; Peter Vermeersch, EU Enlargement and 
Minority Rights Policies in Central Europe: Explaining Policy Shifts in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, 1 J. Ethnopolitics & Minority Issues in Eur. (2003), http://ecmi.de/jemie/ 
download/Focus1-2003_Vermeersch.pdf; Antje Wiener & Guido Schwellnus, Contested Norms 
in the Process of EU Enlargement: Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights (Const. Web Papers, 
No. 2, 2004), http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb. 
13 András Sajó, Protecting Nation States and National Minorities: A Modest Case for National-
ism in Eastern Europe, 1993 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 53, 53 (1993). 
14 See generally Rein Mullerson, Minorities in Eastern Europe and the Former USSR: Problems, 
Tendencies and Protection, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 793 (1993). 
15 Petra Roter, Locating the “Minority Problem” in Europe: A Historical Perspective, 4 J. Int’l 
Rel. & Dev. 221, 221 (2001). 
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enlargement saga is far from over. In 2007, the European Union em-
braced two new Member States (Bulgaria and Romania) and more 
will join in the future. Three countries currently enjoy a candidate 
country status: Croatia; Macedonia (FYROM); and Turkey.16  More-
over, a number of countries in Europe, including Albania, Armenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, Moldova, Serbia, and 
Ukraine, made it clear that joining the European Union is among 
their foreign policy priorities. In other words, the European Union 
stands somewhere in the middle of its enlargement road. In the fu-
ture, enlargements are likely to stay on the EU agenda for several 
decades. It goes without saying that all countries in question, and es-
pecially Turkey with its treatment of the Kurdish minority,17 and the 
Balkan states recovering from violent ethnic conflicts, have a number 
of outstanding minority issues.18 The European Union will have to 
address these issues during the pre-accession process. To effectively 
do so, a reliable minority protection standard is required. 
 As analysis of the application of the conditionality principle dem-
onstrates, the European Union employed at least two mutually exclu-
sive standards during the pre-accession process. The first was roughly 
built on the idea of tolerating (forced) assimilation (in Estonia and 
Latvia). The second was based on the idea of cultural autonomy (ap-
plied in other countries and, in particular, in Romania, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria).19 This process, although reflecting the state of normative 
disarray of internal EU minority protection, is ill-suited both for the 
conduct of future enlargements and, more importantly, for the effec-
tive protection of minorities within the European Union. Some difficult 
choices will have to be made in the near future to change this situation. 
 This Article illustrates two main clashes inherent in EU minority 
protection. First, building inter alia on the works of Hillion,20 Hughes 
                                                                                                                      
16  Eur. Comm’n, Candidate Countries, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2008). Two of these countries, Croatia and Turkey, have 
already started accession negotiations. Both started negotiating on October 3, 2005. See EU-
Croatia Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/index_en.htm (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2008); EU-Turkey Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkey/eu_turkey_ 
relations_en.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2008); see also EU-Turkey Negotiating Framework, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_ framdoc_en.pdf. 
17 See Dogu Ergil, The Kurdish Question in Turkey, 11 J. Dem. 122, 130–35 (2000). 
18 The former Yugoslav republics have only recently turned to a balanced approach on 
minority issues. See generally Antonija PetriIu»iG, Constitutional Law on the Rights of National 
Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, 2 Eur. Y.B. Minority Issues 607 (2003). 
19 See infra Section V. 
20 Hillion, supra note 12, at 714–40. 
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and Sasse, 21  and Wiener and Schwellnus, 22  it discusses the internal-
external divide in EU minority protection, which allows for the promo-
tion of minority protection outside EU borders while tolerating the ne-
glect of minority issues within. Second, through the use of several ex-
amples, this Article demonstrates that a double standard of minority 
protection arose from external minority protection activity of the Euro-
pean Union during preparation for the fifth and sixth enlargements. 
These contradictory practices are put into the broader context of avail-
able minority protection standards. 
 The whole edifice of EU minority protection that miraculously 
stands today is thus built on two contradictions and is unable to serve 
its main function—namely, to provide effective protection for minori-
ties in the European Union. 
I. Structure of the Argument 
 After briefly discussing the theoretical debate surrounding the 
very idea of minority protection (focusing on Kymlicka and Waldron), 
this Article first makes a clear distinction between the nondiscrimina-
tion approach taken by the Community and best articulated in the 
Race Directive,23 and a fully fledged vision of minority protection as 
understood in the Permanent Court of International Justice’s (PJIC) 
Minority Schools in Albania case24 that also includes special minority pro-
tection measures not limited to simple nondiscrimination. It then 
summarizes some legal provisions that could potentially enable the 
European Union to espouse a fully-fledged approach to minority pro-
tection. Second, this Article briefly focuses on the internal-external mi-
nority protection divide in the European Union, providing a summary 
of minority protection measures promoted by the European Union ex-
ternally and constituting part of EU enlargement law. This Article also 
discusses the rare internal references to minority protection, which 
mostly come from political documents lying outside the normative 
                                                                                                                      
21 Hughes & Sasse, supra note 12, at 1–30. 
22 Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 1–39. 
23 Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 [hereinafter Race Directive]. 
24 See Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A./B.) No. 64 (Apr. 6, 1935). In 
this case, involving Greek minority schools in Albania, the Court established that formal 
equality was not enough to guarantee equal rights for the Greek minority residing in Al-
bania and special rights were needed. See id. The Court found that “there would be no true 
equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions 
and were consequently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of 
being a minority. Id. 
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framework of EU law. The paradoxical difference between what the 
European Union itself adhered to and what it promoted is illustrated 
by one of Joseph Wieler’s maxims: “do not do what I do, do what I tell 
you to do”25 (initially ascribed to “officers” but equally applicable to the 
European Union’s policy line in the field of minority protection). 
Third, this Article focuses on EU minority protection standards during 
the fifth and the sixth enlargement rounds and connects the inade-
quacy of the European Union’s internal approach to minority protec-
tion with the inadequacy of the external one. To do so, the Article 
looks into the substance and structure of the Copenhagen-related 
documents released during the preparation of the Eastern enlarge-
ment with a view to discovering a standard the European Union used 
while applying the conditionality principle in this field. 
 Finally, having discovered at least two of such standards, the Arti-
cle focuses on the inadequacy of the whole approach to minority pro-
tection taken by the European Union. 
II. Should the European Union Build Disneylands?  
Waldron vs. Kymlicka 
 It has been suggested that liberal democracies should take a neu-
tral stance vis-à-vis ethnocultural diversity and that equality alone, with-
out specific minority protection rights, can meet the needs of minori-
ties.26 Moreover, the negative effects of minority protection are clear, 
demonstrating the human need to belong to a distinct community,27 
which in the past was taken for granted.28 Thus, the very core of argu-
ments promoting specific rights for minorities has been seriously ques-
tioned. Jeremy Waldron opined that: 
[I]mmersion in the traditions of a particular community in the 
modern world is like living in a Disneyland and thinking that 
one’s surroundings epitomize what it is for a culture really to 
exist. Worse still, it is like demanding funds to live in a Disney-
land and the protection of modern society for the boundaries 
                                                                                                                      
25 J.H.H. Weiler & Sybilla C. Fries, A Human Rights Policy for the European Community and 
Union: The Question of Competences ( Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/99, 1999), available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers99.html. 
26 See, e.g., Brian Barry, Culture & Equality 317–28 (2001); Juha Räikkä, Is a Mem-
bership—Blind Model of Justice False by Definition?, in Do We Need Minority Rights? 3, 3–19 
( Juha Räikkä ed., 1996). 
27 Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 751, 756 (1992). 
28 Id. at 759. 
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of Disneyland, while still managing to convince oneself that 
what happens inside Disneyland is all there is to an adequate 
and fulfilling life.29 
 Will Kymlicka provides a drastically different approach. His ar-
gument is built around an absolute necessity to have specific minority 
instruments, based on the assumption that no polity can be truly eth-
nically neutral.30 This approach coincides with that of the League of 
Nations.31 
 The lack of scholarly consensus on this issue is telling. A number 
of different practical approaches to minority protection adopted by EU 
Member States reflect the diversity of theories in the area. This diversity 
becomes even more striking during enlargement preparation.32 
 Compared to Waldron and Kymlicka’s theories, the European Un-
ion is somewhere in the middle.33 Although it does not provide a fully-
fledged minority protection mechanism, it does not exclude the possi-
bility of institutionalizing minority protection and even recognizes it. 
Community Law in the sphere of minority protection might not be well-
articulated, but it is certainly far from being “non-existent,” as Hughes 
and Sasse argue.34 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 763. 
30 See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture 1–5 (1989). But see Mar-
lies Galenkamp, Speciale rechten voor minderheden? Een commentaar op Kymlicka’s Multicultural 
Citizenship, 22 Recht en Kritiek 202, 215, 217–23 (1996); Waldron, supra note 27, at 781–
88. 
31 See Gaetano Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law 27–29 (2002) [here-
inafter Minorities in International Law]. 
32 See Norbert Rouland et al., Droit des minorites et des peuples autochtones 
261–305 (2006); Roberto Toniatti, Minorities and Protected Minorities: Constitutional Models 
Compared, in Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies 195, 205–12 (Mi-
chael Dunne & Tiziano Bonazzi eds., 1995). 
33 On the main aspects of minority protection in the EU legal context, see generally 
Niamh Nic Schuibhne, EC Law and Minority Language Policy (2003); Maria Amor 
Martín Estébanez, The Protection of National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, in 
The European Union and Human Rights 133 (Nanette Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds., 
1995); Niamh Nic Schuibhne, The EU and Minority Language Rights, 3 Int’l J. Multicul-
tural Soc’ys 61 (2001); Bruno de Witte, Politics versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic 
Minorities, in Europe Unbound 137 ( Jan Zielonka ed., 2002) [hereinafter Politics v. Law]; 
Martin Brusis, The EU and Interethnic Power-Sharing Arrangements in Accession Countries, 1 J. 
Ethnopolitics & Minority Issues in Eur. (2003), http://ecmi.de/jemie/download/Fo- 
cus1-2003_Brusis.pdf; Gabriel von Toggenburg, A Rough Orientation Through a Delicate Rela-
tionship: The European Union’s Endeavours for (its) Minorities, 4 Eur. Integration Online 
Papers (2000), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop [hereinafter Rough Orientation]. 
34 Hughes & Sasse, supra note 12, at 2. 
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III. Nondiscrimination, Special Rights and Albanian Schools 
 International law has long recognized minority protection.35 Ac-
cording to an established practice,36 articulated by the PCIJ in the Ad-
visory Opinion concerning minority schools in Albania,37  minority 
protection consists of two main components: non discrimination on 
the one hand and special measures for minority protection on the 
other.38 Although these elements are certainly interconnected, their 
essence remains different. 
 In Europe, the Council of Europe (CoE) has been especially suc-
cessful in dealing with these components, which play an important role 
in minority protection. The CoE legal system makes a rather successful 
attempt to combine both of them through the use of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Framework Con-
vention)39 and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Lan-
guages,40 coupled with the nondiscrimination provisions of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).41 Next to ECHR article 
14, which has acquired new importance after the entry into force of 
Protocol 12 to the ECHR (making the self-standing use of the article 
                                                                                                                      
35 For recognition of minority protection by the United Nations, see International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 26–27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, avail-
able at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 art. 1.1, 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm (clarifying the meaning of the 
term “racial discrimination”). For recognition of minority protection in international law, 
see generally Athenasia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Justifications for Minority Pro-
tection in International Law (1997); Kristin Henrard, Devising an Adequate Sys-
tem of Minority Protection (2000); Minorities in International Law, supra note 31 
Gaetano Pentassuglia, Defining “Minority” in International Law (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Defining “Minority”]; Gaetano Pentassuglia, On Models of Minority Rights Supervision in 
Europe and How They Affect a Changing Concept of Sovereignty, 1 Eur. Y.B. Minority Issues 29 
(2001); Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff & Tatjana Ansbach, Les minorités en droit intrenational, in 
Le droits et les minorites 15 (Alain Fenet et al. eds., 1995). 
36 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation & Prot. of Minorities, Report Submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, § 5, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/52 (Dec. 6, 1947) (prepared by Joseph Nisot). 
37 Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. at 17. 
38 Henrard, supra note 12, at 59; see also Will Kymlicka, Introduction to The Rights of 
Minority Cultures 1–29 (Will Kymlicka ed. 1995) (defending this position). 
39 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995, Eu-
rop. T.S. No. 157 [hereinafter Framework Convention]. 
40 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992, Europ. T.S. 
No. 148. 
41 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
14, Dec. 10, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. 
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possible),42 and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Eur. Ct. H.R.),43 the Framework Convention and the Charter form the 
most developed international minority protection system to date, com-
bining binding and nonbinding legal documents aiming at the creation 
of a well-regulated minority protection regime in Europe. 
 It is necessary to keep in mind, however, that simply focusing on 
equality without providing minorities with specific group rights is an-
other approach consistent with the notion of democracy.44 In other 
words, the two-tier system of minority protection is desirable to protect 
fully the interests of the minorities, but there is no obligation in inter-
national law to institute such a system. 
A. The European Union and the Nondiscrimination Part of the Standard 
 European Union law as it stands to date clearly gives an over-
whelming priority to the nondiscrimination part of minority protec-
tion. This being said, it would be unfair to argue that this approach is a 
consequence of a particular doctrinal choice made by the Community. 
Unlike some of its Member States, such as France,45 the European Un-
ion has not defied the PCIJ’s position, but is simply not ‘mature’ 
enough in this respect to go further than Waldron’s nondiscrimination 
minimum. The first component of minority protection (i.e. nondis-
crimination based on belonging to a minority) is incorporated into the 
Community legal order via the Race Directive46 based on article 13 of 
the EC Treaty and article 6(2) of the EU Treaty, in which reference to 
the ECHR is made, thus making a connection between article 14 of the 
ECHR and the principles of Community Law. Article 2 of the Directive 
states that “there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on 
racial or ethnic origin.” Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits discrimina-
tion on the grounds of “sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
                                                                                                                      
42 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177. 
43 See generally Geoff Gilbert, The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 24 Hum. Rts. Q. 736 (2002) (examining jurisprudence of European 
Court of Human Rights as it relates to minority groups). 
44 Nathan Glazer, Individual Rights Against Group Rights, in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, supra note 38, at 123, 133; see also Waldron, supra note 27, at 752–57 (defending 
position similar to that of Glazer). 
45 See CC decision no. 99–412DC, June 15, 1999, available at http://www.conseilconsti- 
tutionnel.fr/decision/1999/99412/99412dc.htm (determining that group rights are uncon-
stitutional in France); see also Frank Hoffmeister, Monitoring Minority Rights in the Enlarged 
European Union, in Enlarged European Union, supra note 12, at 85, 89–90. 
46 Race Directive, supra note 23, arts. 1–4. 
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other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national mi-
nority, property, birth or other status.” 
 Read together, these provisions make it clear that nondiscrimina-
tion on the grounds of national origin or association with a national 
minority is elevated to one of the principles of Community Law.47 This 
legal framework is reinforced by article 21(1) of the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR).48 Article 21(1) of 
the CFR, which is based on the set of legal instruments outlined 
above, namely articles 14 of the ECHR, 6(2) of the EU Treaty, and 13 
of the EC Treaty, reads as follows:49 
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, religion or be-
lief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation 
shall be prohibited.50 
 Although the CFR is a “proclaimed” document having no binding 
force, its potential is illustrated by the references to its provisions made 
both by the ECJ51 and the Court of the First Instance (CFI).52 In other 
words, although not binding,53 the CFR plays a role in the Community 
legal system.54 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Hillion, supra note 12, at 718–21. 
48 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 13. 
49 Council of the Eur. Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Ex-
planations Relating to the Complete Text of the Charter 1, 39 (2000) [hereinafter 
Explanation of Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
50 See generally Guido Schwellnus, “Much Ado About Nothing?” Minority Protection and the 
EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights (Const. Web Papers, No. 5, 2001), http://les1.man.ac. 
uk/conweb (Follow the “archive” hyperlink; then follow the “2001” hyperlink)(describing 
effects of provision on minority protection in European Union). 
51 Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. 
I-5769, ¶ 83. 
52 See Case T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2365, ¶¶ 1, 42. 
53 Generally not of legally binding nature, the Charter, which was published as an in-
ter-institutional agreement, binds Community Institutions. Jacqueline Dutheil de la Ro-
chére, Driots de l’homme La Charte des driots fondamentaux et au-delá ( Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 10, 2001), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers01.html. 
For an interesting perspective on the solemn proclamation, see Koen Lenaerts & Eddy de 
Smijter, A “Bill of Rights” or the European Union, 38 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 273, 298, 299 
(2001) (comparing solemn proclamation to insertion into Treaties). 
54 See Cases C-122/99 & C-125/99, D. & Kingdom of Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-
4319, ¶ 97 (using reference to CFR to justify reluctance to protect human rights); see also 
Allard Knook, The Court, The Charter, and the Vertical Division of Powers in the European Union, 
42 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 367, § 2.4 (2005) (arguing that rationale behind drafting of 
Charter was actually to limit human rights reach of ECJ). 
12 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:1 
 Thus, a number of provisions lay down the basis for, and are able 
to influence further development of, the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion on the ground of belonging to a national minority in Community 
Law. These provisions include articles 6(2) of the EU Treaty, 13 of the 
EC Treaty, 14 of the ECHR, and 21(1) of the CFR as well as Directive 
2000/43/EC. 
B. The European Union and the Special Rights Part of the Standard 
 The principle of nondiscrimination as included in article 14 of the 
ECHR, around which the Community approach discussed above55 is 
built, is narrower in scope than the Copenhagen criterion of “respect 
for and protection of minorities” because it does not include the sec-
ond component of minority protection in light of the PCIJ’s Albanian 
Schools decision. The European Commission on Human Rights estab-
lished that “[ECHR] does not compel states to provide for positive dis-
crimination in favour of minorities.”56 It is just another argument de-
noting that a simple anti-discrimination approach rooted in article 14 
of the ECHR hardly includes a possibility to adopt specific measures 
aimed at improvement of the situation in the sphere of minority pro-
tection. In other words, it does not “reach out to minority rights stricto 
sensu.”57 Even the ECJ’s active approach in several cases involving mi-
norities, where the court viewed nondiscrimination as allowing for posi-
tive measures of minority protection,58 stating inter alia that “protection 
of a [linguistic minority] may constitute a legitimate aim”59 of state pol-
icy, did not change the general picture: the court is yet to establish na-
tional minority protection in a sense broader than simple nondiscrimi-
nation as a principle of Community Law.60 
                                                                                                                      
55 See supra Section III.A. 
56 Silvius Magnago & Südtiroler Volkspartei v. Italy, 1996 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 117, 
120–21 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.). The Commission found that the minimal threshold intro-
duced in the context of parliamentary elections does not constitute discrimination against 
minority parties. See id. 
57 See Minorities in International Law, supra note 31, at 125–26. 
58 Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I−4139 
¶ 42; Case C-379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ., 1989 E.C.R. 3967, ¶ 24. The ECJ has 
also upheld complex affirmative action policies to combat discrimination. See, e.g., Case C-
409/95, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. I−6363; see also Louis 
Charpentier, The European Court of Justice and the Rhetoric of Affirmative Action, 4 Eur. L.J. 167 
(1998). But see Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R 
I−3051. 
59 Case C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings Against Bickel and Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-07637, 
¶ 29. 
60 See Rough Orientation, supra note 33, at 19. 
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 One can outline a number of possibilities to include the second 
element of minority protection into the ambit of Community Law.61 
Probably the most realistic is related to the use of the provisions of the 
EC Treaty dealing with culture.62 It has been argued that Title XII of 
the EC Treaty clearly implies that none of the Member States is cultur-
ally homogeneous,63 as article 151(1) of the EC Treaty states that “the 
Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the 
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity.” 
The Community is also obliged to “take cultural aspects into account in 
its action . . . in order to promote the diversity of cultures.”64 
 Article 22 of the CFR also contains a reference to diversity, inspired 
by articles 151(1) and (4) of the EC Treaty. It includes cultural, reli-
gious and linguistic diversity, thus indirectly referring to the respect for 
minority rights. It is notable that the drafters of the CFR viewed article 
22 as being rooted in article 6 of the EU Treaty,65 thus denoting that 
diversity is a constitutional principle of the European Union.66 
 The EC Treaty not only requires the Community to “take cultural 
aspects into account in its action,”67 but also creates a climate “to pro-
mote culture”68 through establishing that aid in this domain is “consid-
ered to be compatible with the common market.”69 
 Certain minority protection measures in the cultural sphere were 
in place even during the pre-Maastricht period.70 One such measure 
                                                                                                                      
61 See generally Bruno de Witte, The Constitutional Resources for an EU Minority Protection 
Policy, in Enlarged European Union, supra note 12, at 107, 118–23. 
62  See Bruno de Witte, The Cultural Dimension of Community Law, in IV-I Collected 
Courses of the Academy of European Law 229, 291 (1993); Maria Amor Martín Esté-
banez, Minority Protection and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in Minor-
ity Rights in the ‘New’ Europe 31, 34 (Peter Cumper & Steven Wheatley eds., 1999) 
[hereinafter Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe]; Rough Orientation, supra note 33, at 
11; Schwellnus, supra note 50, at 20. 
63 Adam Biscoe, The European Union and Minority Nations, in Minority Rights in the 
‘New’ Europe, supra note 62, at 93. 
64 Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37, art. 151(4) 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
65 See Explanation of Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 49, at 40. Dec-
laration Number 11 to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the status of churches 
and non-confessional organizations is also mentioned among the provisions on which 
article 22 of the CFR was based. See id.; see also Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, CHARTE 4473/00, Oct. 11, 2000 (providing the explanatory notes of 
the praesidium). 
66 See Rough Orientation, supra note 33, at 7 & n.50. 
67 EC Treaty, supra note 64, art. 151(4). 
68 Id. art. 87(3)(d). 
69 Id. art. 87(3). 
70 See Rough Orientation, supra note 33, at 12. 
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was Directive 77/486 of July 1977,71 concerning the education of mi-
grant workers’ children—nationals of one of the Member States—in 
their mother tongue. It is questionable, however, whether this directive 
is really a minority protection tool because it is inspired by the eco-
nomic free movement and does not protect the rights of migrant work-
ers belonging to the national minorities.72 Although the classical ap-
proach to minority rights usually does not deal with the European 
citizens residing in a Member State other than their own, new studies 
adopt a somewhat more inclusive approach. Bruno de Witte was among 
the first scholars to ask the question “have the Member States of the EU 
become ‘national minorities?’”73 
 A certain evolution is apparent from ECJ case law related to cul-
ture, which is particularly acute for minority protection. Martín Esté-
banez stresses the shift in the court’s reasoning from mainly relying on 
economic considerations to more cultural ones.74 Paying due respect to 
cultural rights, it is clear, however, that the court’s main case law con-
cerning the elaboration of minority protection rights at the Community 
level is mostly related to nondiscrimination,75 which, as stated above, 
stops short of providing fully-fledged minority protection. 
 At present, the second component of the Albanian Schools minority 
protection standard is missing from Community Law. This situation 
does not prevent some scholars from being optimistic about the devel-
opment of internal minority protection system within the European 
Union: “there seem to be already quite a number of building blocks in 
place on the basis of which a more explicit internal minority policy for 
the European Union could be developed if the necessary political will 
                                                                                                                      
71 Council Directive 77/486, On the Education of Children of Migrant Workers, 1977 
O.J. (L199) 32 (EC). 
72 “Economic free movement” is the freedom granted by article 39 of the EC Treaty to 
workers and their family members to reside and work anywhere in the Community on the 
basis of Community Law, not the law of the Member State of residence. It contrasted with 
“non-economic free movement” of other categories of European citizens (guaranteed by 
article 18 of the EC Treaty) which is much more restricted. 
73 Politics v. Law, supra note 33, at 148; see Gabriel von Toggenburg, Minorities (…) The 
EU: Is the Missing Link an “Of” or a “Within”?, 25 Eur. Integration 273, 275–76 (2003). See 
generally Gabriel von Toggenburg, A Remaining Share or a New Part? The Union’s Role vis-à-vis 
Minorities After the Enlargement Decade (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 15, 2006), avail-
able at http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/index.jsp (Follow the “Date” hyperlink; then select 
“2006”)(addressing minority protection in different contexts) [hereinafter The Union’s 
Role]. 
74 See Martín Estébanez, supra note 33, at 144, nn.32–33. 
75 See generally Angonese, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139; Bickel & Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-07637; Groener, 
1989 E.C.R. 3967. 
2008] Ethnic Minority Protections in the EU 15 
could be engendered.”76 The scope of internal EU protection of mi-
norities is thus comparable to the nondiscrimination part of the CoE 
standard, but is slightly wider than that due to its expansion potential to 
cover special rights. 
IV. Internal and External Aspects of Community Action:  
A Minority Rights Paradox 
 In light of the wording of article 6(1) of the EU Treaty, which 
does not explicitly include minority protection, the Copenhagen cri-
terion dealing with respect for and protection of minorities has been 
called a “criterion which was not elevated to the nobility of Primary 
Law.”77 The observations related to the possible reasons why this has 
happened in such a way are numerous. It is clear that consensus con-
cerning minority protection, as well as the political will to put such a 
system in place at the EU level is missing among Member States. This 
is illustrated by the problems related to the drafting and ratification of 
the CoE Framework Convention78 and the declarations adopted by 
EU Member States during this process. According to Bruno de Witte, 
“[T]he notions of ethnic minority and European Union seem, at the first 
sight, to belong to two different worlds.”79 
A. European Union External Dimension of Minority Protection 
 Looking closer, however, it is clear that “the respect for and pro-
tection of minorities” has definitely become a new principle of EU 
enlargement law, marking a long process of minority-related devel-
opments in the context of several enlargements. 
 Certain rules aimed at the protection of the local communities first 
appeared in the context of the first enlargement with a reference to the 
rights of Channel Islanders, Manxmen,80 and the residents of the Færœ 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Martín Estébanez, supra note 33, at 162. 
77 Rough Orientation, supra note 33, § 4.3. 
78 Framework Convention, supra note 39. Basically, as a result of disagreements be-
tween the contracting parties at the drafting stage, the Framework Convention can hardly 
be characterized as an effectively binding document. Charles F. Furtado Jr., Guess Who’s 
Coming to Dinner? Protection for National Minorities in Eastern and Central Europe Under the 
Council of Europe, 34 Colum. Hum. Rgts. L.R. 333, 355–65 (2003). 
79 Politics v. Law, supra note 33, at 137. 
80 Protocol No.3 on the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man to the Act concerning the 
Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the King-
dom of Norway, and the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland art. 2, 1972 O.J. 
(L73) 164 [hereinafter Protocol No. 3]; see K.R. Simmonds, The British Islands and the Com-
munity: III—Guernsey, 8 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 475, 480−82 (1971); K.R. Simmonds, The 
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Islands.81 Such measures, not being minority protection per se, mostly 
limited the application of Community Law to these territories, with a 
goal of preserving local communities. In other words, they constituted a 
sort of “economic” minority protection, which was perfectly in line with 
the purely economic orientation of the Communities at that time. 
 At present, such minority protection measures can only be re-
garded with caution. Although they protect minorities, they also practi-
cally deprive the individuals belonging to the minorities of the part of 
Community Law rights they would otherwise enjoy by limiting the ap-
plication of EU law to the inhabitants of these special areas. In one ex-
ample, although the families granted settlement rights on Sark, the 
feudal fief in the hands of the seigneur of Sark and part of the bailiwick 
of Guernsey,82 were British citizens,83 they were not regarded as fully-
fledged EU citizens because Community Law provisions relating to the 
free movement of workers and the free movement of services did not 
apply to them.84 Although some of these people see this as a blessing, 
others are annoyed by this de facto discrimination and the inability to 
rely on the free movement of persons and services under EC law.85 To 
become fully-fledged EU citizens, the Sarkese, just as any other Chan-
nel Islanders or Manxmen, must reside in the United Kingdom for five 
years.86 
 The de facto discrimination in terms of free movement rights is 
even more acute given that the Channel Islanders as well as Manxmen 
fall within the scope of British nationality, as defined for purposes of 
                                                                                                                      
British Islands and the Community: II—The Isle of Man, 7 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 454, 462–63 
(1970); K.R. Simmonds, The British Islands and the Community: I—Jersey, 6 Common Mkt. L. 
Rev. 156, 167–69 (1969) [hereinafter Jersey]. 
81 Protocol No. 2 on the Faroe Islands, Documents Concerning the Accession to the 
European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 163 art. 
1; Jersey, supra note 80, at 161. 
82 See E.W. Ridges & G.A. Forrest, Constitutional Law 435 (1950). 
83  These families were granted citizenship by virtue of their connection with the 
Crown as a successor of the Dukes of Normandy, not as a British Monarch. See Andrew 
Massey, Modernising Government in the Channel Islands: The Context and Problematic of Reform in 
a Differentiated but Feudal European Polity, 82 Pub. Admin. 421, 427 (2004). 
84 See Protocol No. 3, supra note 80, art. 2; Case C-171/96, Rui Alberto Pereira Roque v. 
His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor of Jersey, 1998 E.C.R. I-4607 (illustrating special 
status enjoyed by islands in EC free movement law). 
85 The status of territories lying mainly outside EU law turned the Channel Islands into 
tax-heavens allowing them to attain the levels of GDP per head which are much higher 
than the UK average. Massey, supra note 83, at 426. 
86 Protocol No. 3, supra note 80, art. 6. 
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EU citizenship in Declaration number 287 annexed to the EEC Treaty 
by the British Government. Point “c” of the Declaration makes an ex-
press reference to Manxman and Channel Islanders, making it clear 
that they are UK nationals for purposes of Community Law.88 In other 
words, the kind of minority protection as used in the Protocols to the 
1972 Act of Accession is of dubious nature. While providing Minorities 
with special protection, it also strips them of some important rights. 
 A somewhat more usable standard of minority protection, includ-
ing the protection of traditional occupations, culture, and linguistic di-
versity, first appeared in EU enlargement law during the fourth enlarge-
ment and dealt with the rights of the Sami people89 and, to a lesser 
extent, with the Swedish-speaking population of the Åland Islands.90 As 
a result of such measures, these minorities were, in the words of von 
Toggenburg, “[S]aved from unwanted effects of the Common Mar-
ket.”91 
 The principle of minority protection also acquired an immensely 
important role in the European Union’s enlargement-flavored external 
relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the 
end of the Cold War,92 especially through the protection of the “rights 
of persons belonging to minorities” clause of the Europe Agreements 
                                                                                                                      
87 Council Declaration, New Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Definition of the Term “Nationals,” 1983 
O.J. (C 23) 1. 
88 Girard-Renée de Groot, Towards a European Nationality Law, 8.3 Elec. J. Comp. L. 1, 6 
(2004), available at http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.html. 
89 See Protocol No.3 on the Sami People, Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession 
of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the King-
dom of Sweden and the Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European Union Is 
Founded arts. 1 & 2, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 352 [hereinafter 1994 Accession Act]. In relation to 
the rights of the Sami people, it is notable that Norway attached declarations to the Final 
Act of the Treaty of Accession reaffirming its commitment to respect the rights of the Sami 
people (with a particular reference to article 27 of the ICCPR) and declaring that Bokmal 
and Nynorsk should enjoy a status equal to Norwegian as the languages of the Communi-
ties. Final Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the 
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European Union Is Founded, § III(G)(38)–
(39), 1994 O.J. (C 241) 395. Norway failed to join the European Union in the end as a 
result of negative outcome of a popular referendum on this issue. 
90 Protocol No. 2 on the Åland Islands, 1994 Accession Act, supra note 89; see Edwige 
Tucny, L’élargissement de l’Union Européenne aux pays d’Europe centrale et 
orientale 16–17 (2000); Dierk Booß & John Forman, Enlargement: Legal and Procedural 
Issues, 32 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 95, 115 (1995). 
91 Gabriel von Toggenburg, Minority Protection in a Supranational Context: Limits and Op-
portunities, in Enlarged European Union, supra note 12, at 1, 24. 
92 Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 2. 
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made with Central and Eastern European countries.93 In other words, 
minority protection formed part of EU enlargement law before the first 
release of Copenhagen-related documents. Yet, only the fifth enlarge-
ment allowed minority protection to acquire a “clear political and legal 
dimension.”94 These developments notwithstanding, no clear minority 
protection clauses were included into the 2003 Treaty of Accession.95 
B. European Union Internal Dimension of Minority Protection 
 Although an established enlargement law principle, minority pro-
tection is far from being well-rooted within the Community. Internally, 
minority protection has only manifested itself at the Community level 
on two occasions, both of them accidental and not expressly aimed at 
minority protection. The first such occasion was the adoption of the EU 
Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern 
Ireland,96 and the second was a Member States’ demarche against Aus-
tria after the inclusion of Jörg Haider’s FPÖ into the coalition govern-
ment in 2000.97 The protection of minority rights was expressly men-
tioned during the crisis on a number of occasions, making scholars 
speculate that “the EU Member States and the EU institutions . . . 
would be opposed to any breach of inter alia minority rights by the Aus-
trian government.”98 Ironically, the report of the “three wise men” who 
had been sent to Austria to investigate the situation concluded that 
Austria “protects the existing minorities . . . to a greater extent than 
                                                                                                                      
93 Marc Maresceau, Pre-Accession, in The Enlargement of the European Union 9, 16 
(Marise Cremona ed., 2003). For general information on the use of the human rights 
clauses in the EU external relations law, see generally Eibe Riedel & Martin Will, Human 
Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC, in The EU and Human Rights 723 (Philip 
Alston ed., 1999). 
94 Rough Orientation, supra note 33, at 11. 
95 von Toggenburg, supra note 91, at 24. The standards applied by the Commission to 
the assessment of minority protection in the candidate countries during the preparation of 
the fifth enlargement are assessed, infra Section V. 
96 Communication to the Council and the European Parliament⎯A Special Support 
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, at 1, 3, COM (1994) 607 
final ( July 12, 1994); see also Cathal McGall, Postmodern Europe and the Resources of Communal 
Identities in Northern Ireland, 33 Eur. J. of Pol. Res. 389, 392 (1998). 
97 Although one can argue that the European Union did not play an important role in 
the Austrian crisis, the actions of the fourteen Member States were obviously coordinated 
and cannot be treated simply as the initiatives of the individual member states. See generally 
Matthew Happold, Fourteen Against One: The EU Member States’ Response to Freedom Party Par-
ticipation in the Austrian Government, 49 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 953 (2000); Michael Mer-
lingen, Cas Mudde, & Urich Sedelmeier, The Rights to Be Righteous?: European Norms, Domes-
tic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria, 39 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 59 (2001). 
98 See Henrard, supra note 11, at 366; Schwellnus, supra note 50, at 21. 
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such protection exists in many other EU countries,”99 thus failing to 
establish a link between the nature of the government in power and 
possible minority rights violations. 
 It is clear that the first example aimed at the establishment of 
peace and security, and the second dealt with democracy and human 
rights protection in the broadest possible sense. Neither of them 
really focused on minority rights, nor did they adopt any viable minor-
ity protection standard or go beyond mere political declarations. Mi-
nority protection only came as an unavoidable consequence of Com-
munity interference. 
 Although absent from the binding sphere of the acquis, minority 
protection is nevertheless well-rooted in the sphere of nonbinding acts 
and political declarations. The importance of minority protection in the 
European Community was asserted by the 1991 Luxembourg European 
Council, which adopted a Declaration on Human Rights. That declara-
tion states that respect of the minority protection principle “will favour 
political, social and economic development.”100 The European Parlia-
ment (EP) has also demonstrated its willingness to contribute to the 
minority protection debate at the EU level on several occasions.101 The 
EP put forward a number of initiatives to introduce minority protection 
into the texts of Treaties during every Treaty revision exercise, but these 
propositions were disregarded and none passed.102 Once again, consen-
sus on this point appears to be missing among the Herren der Verträge. 
                                                                                                                      
99 Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein, & Marcelino Oreja, Report to the European Court of 
Human Rights, § 29 (Sept. 8, 2000). 
100 Declaration on Human Rights, Annex V to the Presidency Conclusions, June 28–29, 
1991. 
101 A number of European Parliament resolutions specifically deal with the problems 
related to minority protection. See, e.g., Linguistic and Cultural Minorities in the European 
Community, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 110; Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minori-
ties in the European Community, 1987 O.J. (C 318) 160; Measures in Favour of Minority 
Languages and Cultures, 1983 O.J. (C 68) 103; Community Charter of Regional Languages 
and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 1981 O.J. (C 287) 106. An-
other group of resolutions mentions the importance of the issue in a wider context. See, 
e.g., Human Rights in the World in 1997 and 1998 and EU Human Rights Policy, 1999 O.J. 
(C 98) 270, 270; Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism and on Further Steps to Combat 
Racial Discrimination, 1999 O.J. (C 98) 488, 489; The Role of Public Service Television in a 
Multi-Media Society, 1996 O.J. (C 320) 180, 181. Numerous resolutions deal with specific 
minorities. See, e.g., The Protection of Minority Rights and Human Rights in Romania, 
1995 O.J. (C 249) 157, 157. 
102 See Bruno de Witte, The European Community and Its Minorities, in Peoples and Mi-
norities in International Law 179 (Catherine Brölmann et al. eds., 1992). We know 
from the history of European integration that proposals put forward by the EP have been 
followed on a number of occasions, though with considerable delay. The possibility to 
combat discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, racial origin or belonging to a national 
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C. The “Officers’ Maxim” Applied (The Paradox) 
 Thus, with the exception of a number of political declarations, the 
idea of minority protection going beyond simple non-discrimination has 
failed to get to the Community level and enter the scope of the acquis 
communautaire, in order that it may have an internal grip on Member 
States.103 Such a limited role of minority protection within the European 
Union does not, however, exclude possible developments in this field.104 
Although pessimistic, it is nevertheless highly unlikely that minority pro-
tection will become a matter of large-scale EU involvement in the near 
future as “there remains an evident lack of competence, i.e. mandate 
provided by the Treaty’s High Contracting Parties, regarding ethnic or 
linguistic minorities.”105 A minority protection standard common to EU 
Member States is also missing.106  All this threatens to turn EU pre-
accession promotion of minority rights into “measuring progress in the 
absence of benchmarks.”107 
 A paradox is evident: an all too powerful principle of EU enlarge-
ment law is not at all important internally.108 Even the absence of mi-
nority protection from the acquis and the non-existence of a common 
Member States’ standard in the field did not prevent the Community 
(and especially the Commission) from giving minority protection full 
priority over other issues during the pre-accession progress assessment 
exercise.109 
 That is to say, just as with general human rights protection,110 mi-
nority protection is an instance in which the difference between “in-
                                                                                                                      
minority (a wording very similar to article 14 of the ECHR) was contained in the 1993 EP 
initiative for a draft Constitution of the European Union, Title VIII. See Eur. Parl. Doc. 
A3-0064/93, § 3(b) (1993). One may speculate that this initiative contributed to the later 
drafting of article 13 of the EC Treaty and the adoption of Directive 2000/43/EC. 
103 See Brusis, supra note 33, at 1; Martín Estébanez, supra note 33, at 135; Schwellnus, 
supra note 50, at 2; Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 2. 
104 See The Union’s Role, supra note 73, at 27. 
105 See Rough Orientation, supra note 33, at 2. 
106 See Schwellnus, supra note 50, at 2; Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 13. 
107 See Hughes & Sasse, supra note 12, at 67. 
108 See Hillion, supra note 12; see also Hughes & Sasse, supra note 12, at 61–62. 
109 See Maresceau, supra note 6, at 16. 
110 In the sphere of human rights protection, the external competences are much 
broader than the internal ones. See Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in 
Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights, in The EU and Hu-
man Rights, supra note 93, at 3, 6–9; Andrew Clapham, A Human Rights Policy of the Euro-
pean Community, 10 Y.B. Eur. L. 309, 345–56 (1990); Dominic McGoldrick, The European 
Union After Amsterdam, in Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty 249, 249–70 (David 
O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999) (illustrating external dimension). 
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ternal” and “external” EU action is crucial.111 Taking minority protec-
tion requirement as an example, one can argue that “in the context of 
pre-accession, the constitutional principle of ‘conferral of powers’112 
does not apply.”113 
 The gap between internal and external EU minority protection 
regulation is especially acute after the fifth enlargement, which has 
only broadened this “political lacuna,”114 effectively separating exter-
nal demands addressed by the Community to the new-comers and the 
internal protection of minorities within the Community.115 
 This gap can give rise to a number of far-reaching problems. 
Clearly, the European Union lost its competence in the field of minor-
ity protection after accession became a fact: pre-accession strategy 
ceased to apply, as did the Copenhagen political criteria. Moreover, the 
EU minority protection system is practically nonexistent and fails to 
provide a reasonable degree of protection.116 Thus, in order for the 
European Union to achieve some results in the sphere of minority pro-
tection, all minority protection reform in the candidate countries 
should be completed before, not after the enlargement. Viewed from 
this perspective, minority protection is distinct from all elements of the 
Copenhagen criteria falling within the scope of the acquis because 
compliance with the latter is tested only after accession,117 and EU in-
volvement remains high. This observation also helps explain the high 
level of attention the Commission pays to monitoring candidate coun-
tries’ compliance with the minority protection criterion, as outlined at 
Copenhagen. 
 Thus, although minority protection in the context of enlargement 
includes both components of minority protection, the European Un-
ion’s “internal” minority protection is based purely on nondiscrimina-
tion, thus covering only half of the standard as outlined in the PCIJ’s 
Albanian Schools case and Kymlicka’s writings. Although a theoretical 
                                                                                                                      
111 van der Meulen, supra note 12, at 5; Schwellnus, supra note 50, at 1. 
112 Treaty Establishing European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 5 [here-
inafter EC Treaty] (“The Community shall act within the limits of powers conferred upon it 
by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned therein.”). 
113 See Hillion, supra note 12, at 716. 
114 von Toggenburg, supra note 91, at 10. 
115 Although ready to discuss minority languages protection in the candidate coun-
tries, the Commission is not ready to give a clear answer to the question regarding protec-
tion of minority languages in France. See Written Question 963/98, 1998 O.J. (C 310) 150. 
116 For an argument for the continuation of minority rights monitoring after enlarge-
ment, see Hoffmeister, supra note 45, at 105. 
117 See, e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 64, arts. 226–228, 234. 
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possibility of embracing the whole approach can, in principle, be found 
in the body of Community Law, the political will to move in this direc-
tion is missing. This picture becomes even more complicated if one 
scrutinizes the EU standards employed during the pre-accession assess-
ment of the candidate countries’ adherence to the minority protection 
criterion. 
V. Pre-Accession Assessment: Is Estonia Really So  
Different from Slovakia? 
 Based on the texts of the Copenhagen-related documents, one can 
develop a classification of the Commission’s approaches to addressing 
minority protection in different candidate countries.118 A number of 
approaches emerge. 
 For some countries, the issue of minority protection was less acute 
due to a lack of a significant minority population. The Commission 
adopted an inclusive approach to monitoring minority protection 
among the candidate countries, and did not specify any minimum mi-
nority population necessary for country monitoring in this field to be-
gin.119 Nevertheless, the Commission has been reproached for expressly 
withdrawing from the assessment of the minority situation in some of the 
candidate countries, Poland is the most telling example of such a prac-
tice.120 The Commission did not even criticize the fact that Poland was 
one of the last among the Central and Eastern European countries to 
ratify the CoE Framework Convention.121 It appears that in some candi-
date countries, conditionality of minority protection during preparation 
for the fifth enlargement was almost not applied, or was only applied at a 
rudimentary level, compared to other candidate countries. 
 It is difficult to establish with certainty the exact sizes of minority 
populations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The statis-
tical data concerning minority population in that region has been 
called a “great illusion.”122 Although minority population data can pro-
                                                                                                                      
118 See Hughes & Sasse, supra note 12, at 14 (making distinction between Roma and 
Russian-speaking minority versus all other minorities). 
119 See infra note 136. Even the situation of tiny minorities, such as Csango in Romania, 
was monitored. See id. 
120 See Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 21–28; see also Vermeersch, supra note 12, 
at 18–21. 
121 Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, 
at 19 (2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/ 
2000/pl_en.pdf (noting that Convention is not ratified). 
122 See Andre Liebich, Ethnic Minorities and Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement 16 
(Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 49, 1998). 
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vide a frame of reference, it is far from reality.123 This issue is especially 
acute in the case of Roma populations;124 it equally concerns all the 
candidate countries, acceding states and the (new) Member States. It is 
clear, however, that in countries that joined the European Union in 
2004 and 2007, millions of people are discriminated based on their be-
longing to a minority group. 
 Judging both by the substance and structure of the Copenhagen-
related documents concerning minority protection in the countries 
that joined in 2004 and 2007, considered by the Commission as prob-
lematic, one sees two distinct groups of states. The Commission’s ap-
proach to them appears to be different, which substantiates the claim 
that “[minority protection] conditionality varies greatly across accession 
states.”125 Despite a simple non-inclusion of the issue of minority pro-
tection in the Copenhagen-related documents, released in the context 
of some candidate countries’ pre-accession process, the Commission 
did not formulate a single approach for all candidate countries where 
this issue was assessed.126 
 The first group of candidate countries included Bulgaria,127 Roma-
nia,128  Slovakia,129  Hungary,130  the Czech Republic,131 and, among the 
                                                                                                                      
123 For some statistical estimates, see id. at app. II. 
124 See Istvan Pogány, Legal, Social and Economic Challenges Facing the Roma of Central and 
Eastern Europe, 2 Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation 2 n.6 (2004), available at 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Resea
rch/PaperSeries/EuropeanisationPapers/PublishedPapers (Follow the “2004” hyperlink); 
Peter Vermeersch, Ethnic Mobilisation and the Political Conditionality of EU Accession, 28 J. 
Ethnic & Migration Stud. 83, 88–89 (2002). 
125 Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 15. 
126 See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Courts in the Process of Articulating Constitu-
tional Rights in the Post-Communist States of Central and Eastern Europe. Part III: Equality and 
Minority Rights (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 1, 2003), available at http://cadmus. 
iue.it/dspace/index.jsp (Follow the “Date” hyperlink; then select “2003”) (discussing mi-
nority protection in constitutional law of countries in this group). 
127 See, e.g., Antonina Zhelyazkova, The Bulgarian Ethnic Model, 10 East Eur. Const. 
Rev. 62, 62–66 (2001). 
128 See generally István Horváth & Alexandra Scacco, From the Unitary to the Pluralistic: 
Fine Tuning Minority Policy in Romania, in Diversity in Action 241 (Anna-Mária Bíró & 
Petra Kovács eds., 2001); Melanie Ram, Minority Relations in Multiethnic Societies: Assessing the 
EU Factor in Romania, 1 Rom. J. Poli. Sci. 2 (2001). 
129 See Kyriaki Topidi, The Limits of EU Conditionality: Minority Rights in Slovakia, 1 J. Eth-
nopolitics & Minority Issues in Eur. 1, 2 (2003), available at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/ 
download/Focus1-2003_Topidi.pdf. 
130 See generally Andrea Krizsán, The Hungarian Minority Protection System: A Flexible Ap-
proach to the Adjudication of Ethnic Claims, 26 J. Ethnic & Migration Stud. 2 (2000); Ver-
meersch, supra note 12, at 11–15. 
131 See, e.g., Vermeersch, supra note 12, at 15–17. 
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present-day candidate countries, Croatia. 132  The Copenhagen-related 
documents concerning minority protection in these countries did not 
contain any special substructure and dealt with a number of minorities, 
mostly concentrating on the situation of the Roma,133 ethnic Hungari-
ans134  (mostly in Slovakia and Romania), and ethnic Turks (in Bul-
garia).135 A number of smaller minority groups were also mentioned 
(e.g., the Csango minority in Romania).136  While dealing with these 
countries, the Commission advocated wider inclusion for the minority 
population, respect and support for minority cultures, introduction of 
education in minority languages (including higher education for some 
minority groups), and never criticized the grant of cultural autonomy.137 
A special emphasis was made on the issue of nondiscrimination on the 
ground of belonging to an ethnic minority. 
 The second group of countries was considerably smaller and in-
cluded Latvia and Estonia. The Copenhagen-related documents con-
cerning the state of minority protection in those countries adopted a 
special structure, different from that contained in the Copenhagen-
related documents dealing with the first group. The discussion fo-
cused on the situation of the “Russian-speaking” minority,138 although, 
                                                                                                                      
132 See generally Antonija PetriIu»iG, Wind of Change: The Croatian Government’s Turn To-
wards a Policy of Ethnic Reconciliation, 6 Eur. Diversity & Autonomy Papers (2004), avail-
able at http://www.eurac.edu/documents/edap/2004_edap06.pdf. 
133 For a general discussion on the Roma population, see Dena Ringold, Roma and 
the Transition in Central and Eastern Europe (2000); Marc W. Brown, The Effect of 
Free Trade, Privatisation and Democracy of the Human Rights Conditions for Minorities in Eastern 
Europe: A Case Study of the Gypsies in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 4 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 275, 276–78 (1998); Pogány, supra note 124; István Pogány, Accommodating an Emergent 
National Identity: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, 6 Int’l J. Minority & Group Rts. 
149, 152–58 (1999); Vermeersch, supra note 12. 
134 See generally Geri Haight, Unfulfilled Obligations: The Situation of the Ethnic Hungarian 
Minority in the Slovak Republic, 4 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 27 (1997) (providing overview of 
situation of Hungarian minority). 
135 See Zhelyazkova, supra note 127, at 62–66. 
136 By mentioning this particular minority in the Regular Reports, the Commission fol-
lowed the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Recom-
mendation 1521: Csango Minority Culture in Romania (May 4, 2001). 
137 For information on the minority protection policies in Eastern European countries, 
see generally Peter Vermeersch, EU Enlargement and Minority Rights Policies in Central Europe: 
Explaining Policy Shifts in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 1 J. Ethnopolitics & Migra-
tion in Eur. (2003), available at http://ecmi.de/jemie/download/Focus1-2003_Vermeersch. 
pdf. 
138 For information on the “Russian-speaking” minority, see generally Lowell Barring-
ton, The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Successor States, 47 
Eur.-Asia Stud. 731 (1995); Ruta M. Kalvaitis, Citizenship and National Identity in the Baltic 
States, 16 B.U. Int’l L.J. 231 (1998); Peter Van Elsuwege, State Continuity and Its Conse-
quences: The Case of the Baltic States, 16 Leiden J. Int’l L. 377, 377–88 (2003); Andrea Han-
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just as in the previous group, a number of other minorities were also 
discussed. In the context of Estonian and Latvian applications for ac-
cession, the Commission relied heavily on the CoE findings139 as well 
as on the findings of the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE),140 and was backing developments drastically dif-
ferent from the demands addressed to candidate countries in the first 
group. Concerning the OSCE’s role, it has been argued that the 
European Union has “delegated to the High Commissioner on Na-
tional Minorities (HCNM) the task of judging whether [the candidate 
countries] have ‘done enough’ in terms of minority rights.”141 The 
references to the OSCE position are contained both in the Europe 
Agreements with Estonia and Latvia142 and in the Accession Partner-
                                                                                                                      
neman, Note, Independence and Group Rights in the Baltics: A Double Minority Problem, 35 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 485 (1995); Jekaterina Dorodnova, EU Concerns in Estonia and Latvia: Implications of 
Enlargement for Russia’s Behaviour Towards the Russian-speaking Minorities (Eur. Univ. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 40, 2000); Nida M. Gelazis, The Effects of EU Conditionality on Citizenship 
Policies and Protection of National Minorities in the Baltic States (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper 
No. 68, 2000); David J. Smith, Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case 
of Estonia, 1 J. Ethnopolitics & Migration in Eur. 1 (2003), available at http://ecmi. 
de/jemie/download/Focus1-2003_Smith.pdf; Vadim Pole»t»uk & Aleksei Semjonov, Mi-
norities and Majorities in Estonia: Problems of Integration at the Threshold of the EU, 
Presentation at International Seminar in Tallinn, Estonia ( Jan. 8–9, 1999), available at http:// 
www.lichr.ee/rus/centre/seminari/seminar1999.rtf. 
139 See Eero Aarnio, Minority Rights in the Council of Europe, in Universal Minority 
Rights 123, 123 (Alan Phillips & Allan Rosas eds., 1995); Geoff Gilbert, Minority Rights in 
the Council of Europe, in Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe, supra note 62, at 53, 53. 
140 See generally Arie Bloed, The OSCE and the Issue of National Minorities, in Universal Mi-
nority Rights, supra note 139, at 113, 123; Rob Zaagman, Conflict Prevention in the Baltic 
States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Eur. 
Ctr. for Minority Issues, Monograph 1, 1999), available at http://www.ecmi.de/rubrik/56/ 
monographs; Wolfgang Zelliner, On the Effectiveness of the OSCE Minority Regime: Com-
parative Case Studies on Implementation of the Recommendations of the High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities of the OSCE (1999) (Inst. for Science & Health, 1999). 
141 See Will Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion, in Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? 
345, 375 (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski eds., 2001). 
142 See Europe Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Commu-
nities and Their Member States and the Republic of Estonia, Preamble, 1998 O.J. (L 68) 3, 
3–4 (“Considering the commitment to the intensification of political and economic liber-
ties which constitute the basis of this Agreement and to further development of Estonia’s 
new economic and political system which respects—in accordance inter alia with the un-
dertakings made within the context of the . . . Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE)—the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.”); see also Europe Agreement Establishing an Association Between 
the European Communities and Their Member States, and the Republic of Latvia, Pream-
ble, 1998 O.J. (L 26) 3, 3–4 (containing an identical provision). 
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ships,143 making the HCNM’s recommendations de facto enforceable 
law in the context of enlargement. 
 The Commission focused on a number of negative developments 
in the field of minority rights in these countries, but ultimately toler-
ated established discrimination against minority groups in Latvia and 
Estonia. Unfortunately, the Commission mostly concentrated on the 
instances of discrimination that were in blunt contradiction with the 
obligations stemming from the Europe Agreements made with Estonia, 
particularly “in the fields of free movement of persons, right to estab-
lishment, supply of services, capital movements and award of public 
contracts.”144 In other words, the market-oriented nature of the Euro-
pean Union prevailed. There was little criticism of the policy of assimi-
lation of the minority population and the exclusion of minorities from 
many spheres of life, which resulted in the marginalization of minori-
ties—a reality in the countries of the second group.145 The policy of the 
countries in question, which the Commission tolerated, amounted to 
attempts to trigger exclusion and, eventually, the emigration of minori-
ties.146 This approach was on its face contradictory to the spirit of inclu-
sion and tolerance the Commission promoted in the first group. 
 Adopting different approaches to minority protection depending 
on the countries in which the assessment was conducted, and a par-
ticular minority in question, is not in accord with the pre-accession 
principle of conditionality that consisted of the objective assessment 
of all candidate countries’ progress based on the same criteria. More-
over, even within each of the groups, the Commission’s approach to 
                                                                                                                      
143 The Accession Partnership with Latvia does not mention the OSCE findings di-
rectly; however, the Accession Partnership, makes a reference to acting “in line with the 
principle of proportionality, international standards and the Europe Agreement.” See 
Council Decision 2002/88, 2002 O.J. (L 44) 45, 47; see also Council Decision 2002/86, 2002 
O.J. (L 44) 29, 31 (making reference, in Accession Partnership with Estonia, to acting “in 
line with both international standards and the Europe Agreement and respects the princi-
ples of justified public interest and proportionality”). 
144 Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Regular Report on Estonia’s Progress Towards Acces-
sion, at 15 (1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_ 
process/past_enlargements/eu10/estonia_en.htm [hereinafter 1999 Estonian Report]. 
145 See infra Sections V. C–G. 
146 See James Hughes, “Exit” in Deeply Divided Societies: Regimes of Discrimination in Estonia 
and Latvia and the Potential for Russophone Migration, 43 J. of Common Mkt. Stud. 739, 740–
46 (2005); Abdullakh Mikitajev, Problemy grazhdanstva russkikh i russkojazychnogo naselenija v 
Latvii i Estonii, 3 Rossijskij biulleten’ po pravam cheloveka 89 (1994), available at 
http://www. hrights.ru/text/b3/bul3.htm. 
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minority protection differed from country to country. Different de-
grees of pressure and scrutiny were applied.147 
 The main differences between the Commission’s approaches to 
the assessment of minority protection in the countries belonging to 
the first and the second group concerned the following issues: 
• Structural approaches to minority rights assessment; 
• Naming the minorities concerned; 
• Different approaches to the link between belonging to a given 
minority and the citizenship of a country in question; 
• Different approaches to minority education in both groups; 
• Different approaches to nondiscrimination in both groups; 
• Different approaches to minority self-government in both 
groups; 
• Different approaches to the political rights enjoyed by minorities 
in both groups.148 
A. Two Groups of Countries and the Structure of the  
Copenhagen-Related Documents 
 Although the Commission built approaches to the integration of 
the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia and the minorities in other 
candidate countries along totally different lines, this difference was not 
reflected in the structure of all the Copenhagen-related documents. It 
would have been naïve to expect the Commission to introduce into the 
regular reporting exercise such a differentiated treatment of minorities 
already at the structural level; this would be in blunt disaccord with the 
principles of enlargement law, making all the reasonable claims for 
predictability of the enlargement process irrelevant.149 Although the two-
tier structure of the problematic countries is not articulated in the 
structure of the Copenhagen-related documents, such as composite 
                                                                                                                      
147 For the differences in the Commission’s analysis of Poland, Hungary and Romania, 
see Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 15. 
148 This list is not exclusive and is drafted solely to provide an example of the varied 
approaches to minority protection used by the Commission. 
149 Scholars argue that by and large the introduction of the principle of conditionality 
and its subsequent application did not make the enlargement process more predictable 
and clear. See, e.g., Christophe Hillion, Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis, in 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union 401, 402 (Anthony Arnull & 
Daniel Wincott eds., 2002); cf. Kochenov, supra note 3, at 300–11. 
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and strategy papers, the same cannot be said about the structure of the 
Commissions regular reports.150 
 The composite and strategy papers’ approach to the issue is unsys-
tematic. The 1998 Composite Paper tackles three main issues concern-
ing minority protection: the situation in Latvia and Estonia; the situa-
tion with Roma; and the situation of Hungarian minorities in Romania 
and Slovakia.151 One can find a similar structure of the assessment of 
the candidate countries’ progress in other papers as well. The 1999 
Composite Paper notes the progress with the handling of minority pro-
tection in Estonia and Slovakia, discusses the need of “finding the right 
balance between legitimate strengthening of the state language and the 
protection of minority language rights,”152 and the situation with Roma 
and Hungarian minorities. The 2001 Strategy Paper narrows the minor-
ity protection assessment to two main issues: the situation in Latvia and 
Estonia and the protection of Roma rights.153 The 2002 Paper’s struc-
ture puts a dividing line between the issues of Roma protection and 
minority protection—the latter includes all other minorities.154 
 Overall, the composite and strategy papers do not provide clear 
guidance through minority protection particularities, and limited to 
inconsistently hand-picking certain issues while failing to see the larger 
picture.155 This demonstrates an approach similar to that the Commis-
sion adopted during the pre-accession assessment of democracy and 
the rule of law in the candidate countries.156 
                                                                                                                      
150 For the structure of the whole body of the Copenhagen-related documents, includ-
ing documents released in implementation of the conditionality principle of the Copen-
hagen criteria, see Kochenov, supra note 11, at 5–7. 
151 Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Composite Paper: Reports on Progress Towards Accession by 
Each of the Candidate Countries, at 4 (1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/composite_en.pdf. 
152 Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Composite Paper: Reports on Progress Towards Accession by 
Each of the Candidate Countries, at 15 (1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
archives/key_documents/reports_1999_en.htm. 
153 Towards the Enlarged European Union: Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commis-
sion, at 13, COM (2001) 700 final (Nov. 13, 2001). 
154 Towards the Enlarged European Union: Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commis-
sion, at 14–15, COM (2002) 700 final (Oct. 9, 2002). 
155 The same lack of guidance is also largely true regarding the pre-accession assessment 
of the rights of sexual minorities. See Dimitry Kochenov, Democracy and Human Rights—Not for 
Gay People? EU Eastern Enlargement and Its Impact on the Protection of the Rights of the Sexual Mi-
norities, 13 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 459, 482–91 (2007) [hereinafter Democracy and Human 
Rights]; see also Peter Van Elsuwege, Prodvizhenije demokratii v sosednikh ES stranakh: Uroki strate-
gii predvaritel’nyh uslovij chlenstva, in Prodvizhenije demokraticheskih tzennostej v rassh- 
iriajushchejsia Jevrope: Izmeniajushchiajasia rol’ Baltijskih gosudarstv ot importërov 
k èksportëram 45 (A. Kasecamp & H. Pääbo eds., 2006). 
156 See sources cited supra note 155. 
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 A different picture is observed through study of the regular re-
ports. Dealing with the second group of countries, the Commission 
applies a specific “naturalization-oriented” structure of the reports, 
including subheadings dedicated to the issuance of residence permits 
and granting citizenship to the members of the minority communi-
ties. Thus, all the regular reports dealing with the second group of 
countries were structurally different from those dealing with the first 
group. The structure the Commission introduced was mainly three-
fold, including: 
1. A naturalization procedure; 
2. Residence permits and special passports for non-citizens; 
and 
3. The integration of minorities.157 
 Several regular reports also contained a subchapter on linguistic 
legislation.158 It is clear from this structure that the Commission shifted 
the accents in its assessment of minority protection in Latvia and Esto-
nia, compared to the minority protection in the first group. Predictably, 
there was considerable difference in the substantive approach to the 
minority protection assessment between the countries in the first and 
second groups. 
B. Different Definitions of “Minority” Applied in the Two Groups 
 As in international law, in which there is no consensus concern-
ing the definition of “minority,” the Commission gave “minority”159 a 
meaning that differed considerably from the definition adopted in 
scholarly literature.160 Moreover, the Commission’s definitions for the 
first and the second groups of countries differed considerably. 
                                                                                                                      
157 See generally Estonian and Latvian Regular Reports, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/key_documents/index_archive_en.htm. 
158 See 1999 Estonian Report, supra note 144, at 14. But see Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 
Regular Report on Latvia’s Progress Towards Accession (1999), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu
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lems these two countries faced). 
159 See Henrard, supra note 12, at 367–70; Mullerson, supra note 14, at 807; Schulte-
Tenckhoff & Ansbach, supra note 35, at 17; John R. Valentine, Toward a Definition of National 
Minority, 32 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Policy 445, 463 (2004). See generally Defining “Minority,” 
supra note 35. 
160 See Henrard, supra note 12, at 367–70; Mullerson, supra note 14, at 807; Schulte-
Tenckhoff & Ansbach, supra note 35, at 17; Valentine, supra note 159, at 463. 
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 A definition of “minority” is nowhere to be found in the Copen-
hagen-related documents, leaving it to the candidate countries to de-
termine whom the Commission was asking them to respect and pro-
tect. Several peculiar features of the Commission’s understanding of 
the term follow directly from the Opinions and regular reports. 
 First, the Commission’s notion of “minority” used in the majority 
of the Copenhagen-related documents is limited to national minorities, 
thus excluding a whole range of other minority groups that might oth-
erwise deserve protection. It is true that the Commission addresses the 
rights of some other minority groups, like religious and sexual minori-
ties, in sections of the Copenhagen-related documents dedicated to 
other groups of rights.161 At the same time, it is surprising that the 
Commission never used the term “national” or “ethnic” minorities in 
the regular reports, insisting on a broader term “minority” that might 
appear misleading. It is worth noting here that article 27 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) distinguishes 
between at least three kinds of minorities: ethnic; linguistic; and reli-
gious.162 The CoE Framework Convention adopts a slightly different 
approach, talking about national minorities without specifying this 
term.163 
 By taking such an ill-articulated view of minorities, the Commission 
did not necessarily act in accordance with a definition of minorities used 
by other Community institutions. The EP, for example, called for laying 
“particular stress on the rights of minorities (ethnic, linguistic, religious, 
homosexual, etc.) at the time of enlargement negotiations.”164 
 Second, there is certainly some confusion in the way the Com-
mission named the minorities whose situation it monitored. It down-
graded the importance of some minorities by defining them differ-
ently from other minority groups in similar situations. Talking about a 
Hungarian minority living in Slovakia or Romania, the Commission 
                                                                                                                      
161 See, e.g., Democracy and Human Rights, supra note 155, n.88 (demonstrating that sex-
ual minorities were not dealt with in the minority rights sections of the Commission’s re-
ports). Religious minorities were dealt with in the context of assessment of the “freedom of 
religion,” which also falls outside of the “Minority Protection” sections of the Copenhagen 
Related documents. See, e.g., See Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Regular Report on Romania’s 
Progress Towards Accession, at 21 (2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-
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162 See Valentine, supra note 159, at 455. 
163 See Gilbert, supra note 139, at 55. 
164 See Eur. Parl. Comm. on Civil Liberties & Internal Affairs, Annual Report on Respect 
for Human Rights in the European Union, Eur. Parl. Doc. A4–0468/98, ¶ 10 (1997) (also 
known as the Schaffner Report). 
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used the term “Hungarian minority,” though in discussing minorities 
in Estonia and Latvia the term was “Russian-speaking minority.”165 The 
denomination of what kind of minority is dealt with in the regular 
reports is of crucial importance and can have considerable implica-
tions on the strategy and practice of minority protection. The term 
“Russian-speaking minority” is arguably narrower in meaning (and 
also might be interpreted to demand a different scope of protection 
compared to other minority groups assessed by the Commission) than 
Russian minority. The latter, also including linguistic rights, puts 
equal emphasis on culture and group identification based on com-
mon history, and values, and is not limited to linguistic factors.166 
Thus, in the context of the two groups outlined supra, the Commis-
sion started differentiating between minorities in Latvia and Estonia 
on the one hand and minorities in the second group on the other by 
defining “minorities” differently. 
C. Minorities and Citizenship: Different Approaches in the Two Groups 
 The Commission behaved wisely by refusing, on several occasions, 
to follow the definitions adopted in a given candidate country, thereby 
trying to look into the substance of the issue of minority protection.167 
This issue was particularly acute for the second group of countries. Lat-
via and Estonia, for example, were eager to make a connection between 
minority status and national citizenship, thus excluding all non-citizens 
living (and often born) in their territory from the scope of application 
of the minority protection criterion. Unlike in the other “states that 
emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union [and] chose a ‘zero op-
tion’ for citizenship, by which all permanent residents were granted 
citizenship without naturalization,”168 huge portions of the permanent 
                                                                                                                      
165 E.g., Agenda 2000—Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application for Member-
ship, Eur. Comm’n Doc/97/12, at 2 ( July 15, 1997), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/estonia/es-op_en.pdf [hereinafter Commission 
Opinion on Estonian Application]; see also EU Enlargement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge- 
ment (containing all other relevant Opinions and Reports issued by Commission) (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2008). 
166 See generally Fernand de Varennes, The Protection of Linguistic Minorities in Europe and 
Human Rights: Possible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts?, 2 Colum. J. Eur. L. 107 (1996) (discuss-
ing linguistic minority rights). 
167 von Toggenburg, supra note 91, at 9. 
168 Lowell Barrington, The Making of Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States, 13 Geo. Im-
migr. L.J. 159, 166 (1999). It is notable that the 1991 Treaty on the Principles of the Inter-
state Relations, between the RSFSR (as Russia was then called) and Estonian Republic, was 
the first step to a similar solution. In Article 3.1, this treaty offered the minorities a choice 
of either Estonian citizenship or citizenship of the RSFSR. At the same time, Article 3.3 
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population of Latvia and Estonia were not granted citizenship rights 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and thus remained state-
less.169 
 In dealing with the countries of the second group, the Commission 
did not allow such a narrow reading of “minority” to become the start-
ing point of the pre-accession assessment. The Commission pointed out 
in the Opinions on the Latvian application for EU membership that the 
assessment of minority protection should be made solely based on the 
de facto situation, “[R]egardless of the nationality held and difference in 
personal status arising from non-possession of Latvian nationality.”170 
One finds an almost identical wording in the Commission’s Opinion 
regarding Estonia’s application. 171  The Commission has consistently 
followed the same approach in the regular reports that followed.172 
Such a constructive approach to the definition of minorities in the con-
text of these two countries’ pre-accession progress resulted in some 
mild changes in the naturalization policy adopted in Latvia and Esto-
nia.173 The Commission stopped short of capitalizing on the achieve-
                                                                                                                      
imposed an obligation to reach a special agreement regarding citizenship issues, but such 
an agreement has never been reached concluded. The Treaty was ratified by the Supreme 
Soviet of the Republic of Estonia on January 15, 1991. See Vedomosti Estonskoj Respubliki 
1991, No. 2. The Treaty was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on December 26, 
1991. See Vedomosti RSFSR 1992, No. 3. 
169 See Slivenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H. R. 467 (2003) (Ma-
ruste, J., dissenting) (discussing occupation thesis); Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions 
and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality Under International Law, 19 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 1141, 1191–94 (1998) (discussing secession and right to nationality under 
international law); Press Release, Alexander Yakovenko, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign 
Aff. of the Russian Federation ( Jan. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ln.mid.ru (discuss-
ing position of Russian Federation concerning Soviet occupation of Baltic States). Some 
argue that the European Union recognized such a position in order to justify its policy of 
differentiation between the Baltic Republics and other post-Soviet states. See generally Peter 
Van Elsuwege, The Baltic States on the Road to EU Accession: Opportunities and Challenges, 7 
Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 171 (2002). 
170 Agenda 2000—Commission Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership in 
the European Union, Eur. Comm’n Doc/97/14, at 18 ( July 15, 1997), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu
10/latvia_en.htm [hereinafter Commission Opinion on Latvia’s Application]. 
171 Agenda 2000—Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application for Membership in 
the European Union, Eur. Comm’n Doc/97/12, at 18 ( July 15, 1997), available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/estonia/es-op_en.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application] (noting that “a distinction should ac-
cordingly be made between rights and protection attendant on membership of an ethnic 
and cultural community irrespective of the nationality held, and differences in personal 
status deriving from the fact of not holding Estonian citizenship”). 
172 Id. 
173  See Dimitry Kochenov, Pre-Accession, Naturalisation, and “Due Regard to Community 
Law,” 4 Rom. J. Poli. Sci. 271, 278–86 (2004). 
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ments stemming from the inclusive definition of minorities for the 
purposes of the pre-accession assessment. Consequently, this approach, 
although beautiful on paper, only brought meager results, leaving much 
to be desired. 
 Although not resulting in any sweeping changes, the Commission’s 
move was, legally speaking, significant because for the first time, the 
candidate countries’ naturalization policies were influenced by EU pre-
accession pressure, which has only limited powers in this domain.174 In 
any other context, the Member States are free (albeit without discrimi-
nation between those falling within the scope of their citizenship once 
it has been outlined,175 and with “due regard to Community Law”)176 to 
decide who their citizens are.177 Thus, starting in 1997 the Commission 
adopted a “realistic” or “inclusive” approach to the assessment of mi-
nority protection in these candidate countries.178 
 The Opinions on the Application for Membership released by the 
Commission on July 15, 1997 enable one to assess the scope of the prob-
lem. According to the Estonian Opinion, “Around 35% of the popula-
tion of Estonia consists of minorities, including non-citizens. . . . Of 
that 35%, a group of 23% (numbering around 335,000, mainly of Rus-
sian origin) are not Estonian citizens.”179 The Latvian Opinion states 
that “[i]n Latvia, minorities, including non-citizens, account for nearly 
44% of the population. . . . Latvians are a minority in 7 of the coun-
try’s 8 largest towns. Within that 44%, 28% of the population, i.e. some 
685,000 people, does not have Latvian citizenship and a large propor-
                                                                                                                      
174 See Karolina Rostek & Gareth Davies, The Impact of European Citizenship on National 
Citizenship Policies, 10 Eur. Integration Online Papers 5 (2006), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/ 
index.php/eiop (giving general overview of how European Union influences national 
citizenship policies). 
175 See Case C-300/04, Eman en Sevinger v. College van burgemeester en wethouders 
van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I–8055. 
176 Case C-369/90, Micheletti v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. I-
4239. 
177 Declarations on this matter were made by Germany (attached to the EEC Treaty) 
and by the United Kingdom (attached first to the 1972 Treaty of Accession by the United 
Kingdom to the European Communities and, later, in light of a new Nationality Act, the 
United Kingdom made a new declaration on the definition of the term “nationals” on 
January 28, 1983). See Case C-192/99, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t. ex 
parte Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. I-1237. For an overview, see Stephen Hall, Determining the Scope ra-
tione personae of European Citizenship: Customary International Law Prevails for Now, 28 Le-
gal Issues of Econ. Integration 355 (2001) (commenting on the Kaur case). 
178 The Commission explicitly recognized the importance of the problem as early as 
1994. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, Orientations for a Union Approach 
Towards the Baltic Sea Region, at 3, COM (1994) 1747 final (Oct. 25, 1994). 
179 Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application, supra note 171, at 18. 
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tion of that group, consisting of the former citizens of the USSR, has no 
citizenship at all.”180 To summarize, in its assessment of nationality poli-
cies, the Commission dealt with the legal status of over one million peo-
ple, making up a considerable share of the population of the candidate 
countries belonging to the second group. 
 The candidate countries themselves considered the persons in 
possession of foreign or no nationality as not being part of the minor-
ity population.181 Consequently, applying this logic to Latvia and Es-
tonia, the Copenhagen criterion of “respect for and protection of mi-
norities” was not applicable to the situation of these people and, as a 
result, could not affect the Latvian and Estonian applications for EU 
membership. One illustration of this point is Estonia’s definition of 
“minority” during ratification of the CoE’s Framework Convention.182 
The Estonian government declared that: 
Estonia understands the term “national minorities” as fol-
lows—Citizens of Estonia that 
  (a) reside on the territory of Estonia; 
  (b) maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with Es-
tonia; 
  (c) are distinct from Estonians based on their ethnic, 
cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; 
  (d) are motivated by a concern to preserve together 
  their cultural traditions, their religion or their language, 
  which constitute the basis of their common identity.183 
The Commission dismissed such a citizenship-centered definition as 
“not relevant.”184 
 The Commission applied the inclusive vision of minorities only to 
Latvia and Estonia. The first group of countries was analyzed based on 
the assumption that persons belonging to a minority hold a nationality 
of the state in which they reside. To illustrate a difference between the 
two approaches to minority definition, consider the Czech definition of 
                                                                                                                      
180 Commission Opinion on Latvia’s Application, supra note 170, at 18. 
181 See infra text accompanying notes 183 & 185. 
182 See generally Framework Convention, supra note 39. 
183  See Estonia, Framework Convention Country Specific Information, http://www. 
coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/Country_specific_eng.asp#P429_22520 (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2008) (emphasis added). Estonia ratified the Convention on January 6, 1997. Id. 
These declarations are not new—Germany and Luxembourg, for example, made similar 
declarations while signing the Convention. See generally id. (containing information on all 
declarations made by States at ratification). 
184 Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application, supra note 171, at 18. 
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minorities, cited by the Commission. The Czech Law on the Rights of 
National Minorities defined minorities as “a group of citizens of the 
Czech Republic living on the current territory of the Czech Republic 
that differentiate themselves from the rest of the citizens, and though 
their ethnic, linguistic and cultural origin, create a minority that at the 
same time wish to be considered a minority.” 185  The Commission, 
moreover, actively participated in the drafting of minority protection 
legislation in the Czech Republic (a pre-accession advisor participated 
in the drafting process as part of the twining program).186 Thus, the 
Commission knowingly approved of such a definition. This definition is 
also used in the law of the CoE, thus, influencing the legal systems of all 
European states.187 It has been noted that such an approach is probably 
not in line with ECJ case law,188 which grants a possibility to benefit from 
the minority protection norms adopted by a Member State not only to 
citizens, but also to residents189 and visitors (as long as they are EU citi-
zens or long term residents in the sense of Directive 2003/109/EC of 
course).190 
 In other words, the Commission asserted its right to apply the 
Copenhagen minority protection criterion to both citizens and for-
eigners (or stateless persons) residing in the candidate countries only 
while dealing with Estonia and Latvia. It is notable that there is no 
principal consensus in the scholarly literature on the topic concern-
ing the notion of minority or the necessity of a link between minority 
status and citizenship.191 Although it is often argued that citizenship is 
a necessary precondition to recognition as a minority,192 many schol-
ars disagree.193 
                                                                                                                      
185 Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Regular Report on the Czech Republic’s Progress To-
wards Accession, at 25 (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ 
key_documents/reports_2001_en.htm (emphasis added). 
186 See Mahulena Hofmann, The 2001 Law on National Minorities of the Czech Republic, 1 
Eur. Y.B. of Minority Issues 623, 624 (2001). 
187 John R. Valentine, Towards a Definition of National Minority, 32 Denver J. Int’l L. & 
Policy 445, 460–66 (2004). 
188 See Wiener & Schwellnus, supra note 12, at 33. For general information on the prin-
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Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (2003). 
189 See Case 137/84, Ministère Public v. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681. 
190 See Bickel & Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-07637, ¶ 31. 
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 Likewise, it is impossible to find a clear solution to this problem in 
the main international legal instruments. One commentator notes that 
the Human Rights Committee established by article 28 of the ICCPR 
recognized that “all members of an ethnic, religious or linguistic mi-
nority are granted minority rights, no matter whether they possess the 
citizenship of the state or not.”194 Neither does the Framework Conven-
tion contain any reference to citizenship. This does not help because it 
does not contain any definition of minority, which would prove that 
citizenship is not among the necessary requirements to be treated as a 
minority. The PCIJ did not include a citizenship requirement in its mi-
nority definition.195 The European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages, on the other hand, contains an explicit citizenship require-
ment for minorities.196 Overall, “The European regional system consid-
ers citizenship as a necessary precondition for membership of a legally 
protected minority.”197 From this standpoint, the Estonian Declaration 
attaching minority status to the citizenship of Estonia is in the main-
stream of legal development in the field of legal definition of minori-
ties, which makes the Commission’s position almost revolutionary. 
 Notwithstanding the innovative nature of the Commission’s move 
toward an inclusive approach to minority definition, the new under-
standing of who should qualify as a minority in Estonia and Latvia 
clearly did not change the approach toward minorities adopted in 
these particular countries. The 2002 Estonian Report underlined that 
Estonia gave too narrow a definition to minorities,198 adding, however, 
that Estonia adopted a more inclusive approach in practice.199 More-
over, such a discrepancy in the definition of who is a minority within 
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mentary 488–89 (1993); Thiele, supra note 191, at 3; Christian Tomuschat, Protection of Mi-
norities under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in Bernhardt, in 
Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte 
961 (Bernhardt Rudolf et al.. eds., 1983). 
194 See U.N. Human Rts. Comm’n, General Comment No.23(50) on Article 27/Minority Rights, 
¶ 5.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 5 (Apr. 26, 1994); Thiele, supra note 191, at 3. 
195 See The Greco-Bulgarian “Communities,” 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17 ( July 31, 1930). 
196 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, supra note 40, art. 1(a)(i). 
197 See Petra Roter, Managing the ‘Minority Problem’ in the Post—Cold War Europe Within the 
Framework of a Multilayered Regime for the Protection of National Minorities, 1 Eur. Y.B. of Mi-
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the scope of the Copenhagen political criteria demonstrated clearly 
that no single approach was used by the Commission during the pre-
accession monitoring exercise. This, yet again, undermined the pre-
accession rhetoric of a single and fair standard equally applicable to 
all candidate countries. 
 As Chief Justice Earl Warren famously stated in Perez v. Brownell, 
“Citizenship is man’s basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to 
have rights.”200 In the context of the Russian speaking minority in Lat-
via and Estonia, the problem of statelessness is aggravated by the fact 
that, by having a stateless status, huge portions of the population of 
these states are de facto prevented from acquiring the nationality of 
the Baltic States in question and EU citizenship, derivative thereof, by 
virtue of strict ethnocentric policy of the states belonging to the sec-
ond group. Low naturalization rates in the second group (particularly 
Latvia) are telling in this regard,201 inviting speculation about ineffec-
tive and discriminatory policy choices in these countries. To claim 
certain limited community rights, members of minority groups, unless 
they are family members of Community citizens, can only rely on Di-
rective 2003/109/EC.202 
D. Different Approaches to Minority Education in the Two Groups 
 Putting the fight for school desegregation aside (which is too 
complicated an issue for this Article)203 the Commission’s approach to 
education of minorities is also inconsistent. Although one minority 
should have a university, other minorities lose their rights to school-
ing in their language.204 In the context of the “Russian-speaking” mi-
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norities, de facto assimilation is stressed, while the Commission’s prin-
ciples concerning the Hungarian minority are absolutely different.205 
 The Commission followed the developments related to the 
amendment of the Law on Education in Romania to create a Hungar-
ian-German University.206 This university was not supposed to become 
the only institution of higher education in Romania operating in mi-
nority languages because Hungarian is used at a number of depart-
ments of state universities in that country.207 
 The developments in Latvia and Estonia reveal that the prohibi-
tion or limitation of teaching in the minority language is considered an 
organic part of the promotion of the state language. In Estonia, Rus-
sian schools get State funding.208 The Law on Basic and Upper Secon-
dary Schools, however, only allows for forty percent of teaching to be 
done in a language other than Estonian starting in 2007,209 which is 
clearly contrary to the Commission’s position in the Opinion on the 
Estonian Application for EU Membership. There, the Commission rec-
ommended that education in Russian language “should be maintained 
without time limit in the future.”210 Latvian education law insists that all 
minority schools choose a bilingual program.211 Minority school teach-
ers not proficient in Latvian are subject to dismissal.212 According to the 
2000 Latvian Report, by 2004 “all state funded schools will provide sec-
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ondary education (from 10th grade onwards) in the state language 
only”; thus, the law is effectively prohibiting education in the native 
language of forty-four percent of the population.213 Strikingly, in re-
sponse to this development the Commission stated that “[t]he Lan-
guage Law and implementing regulations . . . essentially comply with 
Latvia’s international obligations.”214 The Commission’s position is diffi-
cult to explain, as the approval of the Latvian policy banning Russian 
language from schools is clearly contrary to the Commission’s minority 
protection guidelines for the first group of countries, in which education 
in the minority language is supported and safeguarded. Scholars regret 
that “under the present situation there seem to be no clear grounds to 
obstruct the implementation of the Latvian Education Law.”215 
 Although the Commission supported Hungarians in Romania 
schooled in Hungarian in establishing a university in their own lan-
guage, the Russian minority schools in the second group of countries 
are being closed; the Commission did not take issue with this during 
pre-accession. 
E. Different Approaches to Nondiscrimination on the Grounds of Belonging to 
a Minority in the Two Groups 
 In the first group of countries, unlike in the second, the Commis-
sion was attentive to minority representation in Government and the 
police, as well as to the organization of minority self-government. Im-
portantly, minority participation, as promoted by the Commission dur-
ing the pre-accession process, was intended to reach up the hierarchy 
of army and administrative personnel.216 
 The Commission also monitored with great care access to the la-
bor market in general, especially regarding discrimination concerning 
the Roma minority. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Commission and 
the countries of the first group, de facto discrimination flourished.217 
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 A different situation arose in the context of promoting nondis-
crimination in the second group of countries. Judging by the Com-
mission’s Reports and Opinions it is possible to conclude that the 
Commission only regarded the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia 
as a linguistic minority. In the course of the pre-accession process, the 
Commission gave overwhelming priority to the measures related to 
teaching minorities Latvian and Estonian.218 All the Accession Part-
nerships focused on the same issue and the PHARE funding was used 
for the program.219 Thus, language teaching seems to be regarded, by 
the States of the second group and the Commission, as the main tool 
of integration and promotion of nondiscrimination. 
 Viewed from a legal perspective, such an approach is problematic 
because the Commission, in its Reports, does not draw a line between 
integration and assimilation, and arguably supports the complete as-
similation of the Russian minority, which is clearly a state policy in the 
two Baltic States. Such a policy contradicts article 5(2) of the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of Minorities, which states that “the 
Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of 
persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall 
protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation.”220 
 But what is most striking is that the Commission, on a number of 
occasions, simply refused to acknowledge that there were problems 
concerning treatment of the Russian-speaking minority, unreservedly 
taking the side of the two Baltic States. It is as if the Commission “par-
ticipates in a national conspiracy of silence, [like some Estonians and 
Latvians who] simply seem to refuse to acknowledge that the Russian 
minority may have legitimate complaints.”221 All reports dealing with 
Latvian and Estonian preparation for accession, state that the rights of 
the Russian-speaking minority, with or without Estonian or Latvian na-
tionality, continue to be observed and safeguarded.222 In fact, this stan-
                                                                                                                      
218 Marc Maresceau, Quelques réflexions sur l’origine et l’application de principes fondamen-
taux dans la stratégie d’adhésion de l’Union européenne, in Le driot de l’Union européenne 
en principes 91–93 (2006) [hereinafter Quelques réflexions]. 
219 Id. at 92–93. 
220 Framework Convention, supra note 39, art. 5(2). 
221 Richard C. Visek, Creating the Ethnic Electorate through Legal Restorationism: Citizenship 
Rights in Estonia, 38 Harv. Int’l L.J. 315, 357 (1997). 
222 See Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Regular Report on Estonia’s Progress Towards Acces-
sion, at 11 (1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/ 
reports_1998_en.htm; 1998 Latvian Report, supra note 211, at 13. 
2008] Ethnic Minority Protections in the EU 41 
dard was set in 1997 by Agenda 2000, which did not find any “evidence 
that [Russian-speaking] minorities are subject to discrimination.”223 
 In other words, according to the Commission, there is basically no 
minority problem in the two Baltic States and thus no discrimination. 
Ironically, the Commission returned to the issue of minority discrimi-
nation in later regular reports, mostly addressing discrimination arising 
from the absence of nationality, having a “non state language” as a 
mother tongue and related to the use of the minority language, social 
security, education, work, and political representation. 224  The far-
reaching nature of the institutionalized discrimination based on be-
longing to a minority in place in Latvia and Estonia received extensive 
coverage in academic literature.225 Researchers’ findings are in clear 
contradiction with the Commission’s claims. 
F. Different Approaches to Minority Self-Government and Political Rights of 
Minorities in the Two Groups 
 Another important issue that arose during preparation for the fifth 
enlargement concerned the adaptation of the candidate countries’ po-
litical systems to better accommodate minority needs. The Commis-
sion’s demands to change legislation went as high as the candidate 
countries’ constitutional level. In Bulgaria, for example, considering 
the Constitutional prohibition to form political parties around ethnic, 
religious or racial lines, the Commission found that “[i]t could be de-
sirable to clarify these Constitutional provisions about the restrictions 
on the establishment of the political parties.”226 
 Although a number of minorities in the first group of countries 
benefited from the possibility of forming political parties, using their 
language in communication with the authorities, and the grant of a 
share of self-government (whether for Hungarians in Romania or the 
Roma in Hungary), the Russian minority in the second group was again 
treated differently. The difference in treatment was largely caused by 
the stateless status of a huge number of individuals among the Russians 
in Latvia and Estonia. 
 Generally speaking, it is clear that “the inability of nearly one  third 
of the population of these states to participate in elections (which is a 
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reality, albeit to a different extent, in Latvia and Estonia) is hardly in 
line with norms established by western democracies.”227 Latvian and 
Estonian non-citizens cannot vote in national elections or be members 
of political parties.228  This has been criticized by the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee,229 the CoE and the OSCE, but not by the Commis-
sion.230 
 Even those possessing citizenship of the state in which they reside 
face enormous obstacles if they try to participate in political life. The 
Commission did little to change the situation. According to Latvian law, 
candidates running for office, even if Latvian citizens, had to produce a 
language proficiency certificate.231 Latvia lost a case in the European 
Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H.R.)232 and proceedings in front of 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee233 in relation to this requirement. 
The Eur. Ct. H.R. case Podkolzina v. Latvia involved a Latvian of Russian 
descent who was not allowed to run for office although she possessed a 
language proficiency certificate of the highest third level on the 
grounds that she failed a “linguistic check,” administered at her work 
place by a special officer without prior notification. In 2002, the Eur. 
Ct. H.R. found that Latvia violated the claimant’s right to free elections, 
at the same time recognizing the importance of the legislation in force, 
which pleased the Commission.234 Indeed, the court stated that “requir-
ing a candidate for election to the national parliament to have suffi-
cient knowledge of the official language pursues a legitimate aim.”235 
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 Soon after the Podkolzina case was decided, the Latvian Parliament 
amended the relevant legislation, lifting the linguistic proficiency re-
quirements for candidates in national and local elections, which the 
Commission welcomed. 236  Interestingly, the amendment came right 
before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in 
Reykjavik in May 2002, which was supposed to discuss inter alia the Lat-
vian application for membership in the organization.237 Such a coinci-
dence made scholars suspect that the law was actually amended “for the 
NATO.”238 Indeed, the Commission, well aware of the practices of arbi-
trary linguistic checks of Latvian citizens belonging to a minority willing 
to run for office, did not take any measures to make Latvia reconsider 
its policy. 
 The majority of Russians in the second group of countries remain 
largely excluded from political life because of their stateless status. In 
other words, the citizenship legislation (or the lack thereof)239 was used 
in those countries to create ethnic electorates,240 which does not com-
port with the democratic principles of inclusion and nondiscrimination. 
G. Different Approaches to International Minority Protection  
Instruments in the Two Groups 
 Although Estonia at least ratified some international minority pro-
tection instruments by the time of its EU accession, the same cannot be 
said of Latvia. The Commission has been stressing the importance of 
Latvian ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
Minorities throughout the reporting exercise, starting with the Opinion 
on the Latvian Application for EU Membership.241 By the time the last 
Report (structurally based on the Copenhagen criteria) was released, 
the Convention still was not ratified. The delays, which eventually re-
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sulted in non-accession to the Convention, did not hamper Latvian 
prospects of joining the European Union.242 
H. Analysis of the Commission’s Approach 
 From the examples mentioned above it is clear that the Commis-
sion’s approach vis-à-vis minorities in each of the two groups of coun-
tries was not uniform. In fact, all the steps of the pre-accession assess-
ment and the application of the principle of conditionality were de facto 
built along two different lines. The choice of a minority-protection 
standard to be promoted depended on the country (whether within 
the first or second group) and minority in question. The first standard 
was vaguely built around the approach to minority protection in the 
CoE documents and was applied in the context of the first group of 
countries. The second standard, built around the practices of tolerating 
exclusion and forced assimilation (deemed illegal by CoE minority pro-
tection documents) was applied to minorities in the second group. 
 Such a discrepancy between the two approaches taken by the 
Commission is nothing short of a disaster for the application of the 
conditionality principle in this field.243 Moreover, given the similarities 
between the practices espoused by the second group of countries dur-
ing the pre-accession process, the Commission’s logic of conditionality 
becomes even more impenetrable with regard to the choice of coun-
tries with which to open negotiations. It is impossible to find any consis-
tent explanation as to why the negotiations with Estonia have been 
opened before Latvia. 
 It is difficult to disagree with Marc Maresceau, who stated that 
“[t]he true and complete story of this unexpected choice by the Com-
mission will probably never be fully known.”244 The only possible ex-
planation for such a choice is probably geo-political necessity, which has 
nothing to do with political conditionality.245 This necessity is the same 
that likely explains the existence of two pre-accession minority protec-
tion standards applied by the Commission during the preparation of 
the fifth enlargement. Some authors link the EU decision not to in-
clude Latvia within the first wave of countries to several events that took 
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place in 1998.246 These events included a violent dispersion of a dem-
onstration of “Russian-speaking” pensioners in March, the explosion of 
a bomb in front of the Russian embassy in Riga in April, and a march of 
the Waffen SS veterans in the Latvian capital, attended by a number of 
senior Latvian military officials.247 Taken together, these events do not 
produce a convincing success story on the integration of the Russian 
minority. Nevertheless, Latvia and Estonia already met the Copenhagen 
political criteria in 1997, as implied in the Commission’s Opinions.248 
 Returning to the standards, the Commission’s stance in the field of 
minority rights is particularly ironic. Minority protection was probably 
the only area of pre-accession monitoring in which relatively clear stan-
dards were actually available, thanks to the CoE.249  Compared with 
other areas, in which such standards simply did not exist, and in which 
the Commission was trying to act as a “myth-maker,” playing as if it had 
such standards at hand (e.g., in judicial independence),250 the Commis-
sion, instead of applying ready-to-use CoE findings, came up with two 
distinct approaches that contradicted each other and sat uneasily next 
to the CoE documents. The example of the application of the pre-
accession conditionality principle to the requirement of the “protection 
of and respect for minorities” illustrates the necessity to better cooper-
ate. This is apparent from the relations between the European Union 
and the CoE (particularly in the context of the preparation of the 
enlargements of the former).251 
 The approach of the two Baltic States can probably be explained 
with the concept of “ethnic democracy.” Ethnic democracy, a concept 
formulated in Israel, is understood as “a political system that com-
bines extension of democratic rights for all with institutionalization of 
dominance by one ethnic group.”252 The use of this Israeli concept in 
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EU Member States “united in diversity”253 is somewhat dubious. In 
contrast with the idea of domination implied in the concept, the bases 
of the European Union are pluralism and tolerance. 
 What could the Commission do to change the situation in the 
sphere of minority protection in the countries of the second group? 
The tools available to the Commission within the framework of the EU 
conditionality principle and enhanced pre-accession policy,254 applied 
during the preparation of candidate countries for EU accession, pro-
vided the Commission with a wide range of options for solving the 
statelessness crisis in Latvia and Estonia. This allowed unification of the 
two contradicting approaches it applied during preparation for the 
fifth enlargement. Moreover, as follows from other areas of the pre-
accession reform, these tools could be used in a flexible way to ensure 
better compliance, without bluntly dictating to candidate countries the 
kind of policies they are expected to adopt.255 
 At least three options were available to the Commission: 
1. To challenge discrimination on the grounds of the non-
possession of a citizenship status by the residents of Latvia and 
Estonia; 
2. To promote milder conditions for naturalization; or 
3. To attack the citizenship policies of Latvia and Estonia di-
rectly, which would have resulted in minority acquisition of 
citizenship and thus the elimination of the most severe forms 
of discrimination. 
 The Commission had two main tools with which to pursue these 
developments. First, it had the Micheletti v. Delegación del Gobierno en Can-
tabria reference to the importance of a due regard of Community Law 
while granting citizenship.256 The second builds on the assumption that 
“external pressure can be a powerful force for change.”257 Most notable 
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within this second category, the European Union could have made ef-
fective use of the Accession Partnerships, which allows the halting of 
pre-accession financial assistance in cases of non-compliance258 and en-
ables the Commission to go as far as freezing accession talks. Scholarly 
literature and the tools available to the European Union within the 
auspices of the pre-accession strategy, make clear that the European 
Union was in a privileged position to monitor and influence the minor-
ity situation in Estonia and Latvia.259 
 While dealing with the first group of countries, unlike the sec-
ond, the Commission used the third approach outlined above: the 
constructive critique of the grounds of naturalization. The issue was 
resolved quickly.260 It concerned the citizenship law of the Czech Re-
public, drafted to exclude the possibility of the Roma acquiring Czech 
citizenship.261 The Commission found that the approach taken by the 
Czech Republic (especially the need to provide evidence of clean 
criminal record for five years) was inadmissible and contrary to the 
succession rule. It thus demanded that the candidate country alter its 
naturalization policy, including the grounds for naturalization as in-
cluded in the Czech law No. 40/1993 Sb.,262 something that had never 
happened in the context of reporting of Latvian or Estonian progress 
toward accession.263 
 Strikingly, all the international organizations and a great majority 
of scholars working on the minority protection issue in the two Baltic 
States do not discuss the legitimacy of the naturalization policy the two 
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countries applied. An important exception is the position of Ferdinand 
de Varennes, who is among the few to question the legitimacy of lin-
guistic proficiency requirements in those countries.264 “The exclusive 
preference given to Latvian and Estonian seems disproportionate and 
unreasonable as an attempt to rectify past Soviet practices, bearing in 
mind the number of permanent residents born in Estonia and Latvia 
but not of Estonian or Latvian ‘ethnic origin.’”265 It is notable that in-
ternational legal practice recognizes the application of the principle of 
nondiscrimination in the acquisition of citizenship.266 Citing a dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza in a Costa-Rican naturalization 
case of the Inter-American Court, de Varennes makes a convincing ar-
gument that “a reasonable and nondiscriminatory naturalization policy 
must reflect, in a balanced way, the population of a state. It cannot op-
erate in disregard of the languages actually used in the country.”267 Un-
fortunately, neither the Council nor the CoE supported this approach. 
Conclusion: Too Many Paradoxes 
 As this Article demonstrates, the web of minority protection stan-
dards in Europe is sophisticated. Not only are there CoE standards on 
the one hand and EU standards on the other, but EU standards are 
split into internal and external groups. The latter are broader in scope, 
while the former are hardly articulated. Despite such a split, it remains 
clear that it is still possible for the European Union to develop a mean-
ingful internal minority protection standard in the future, once there is 
better consensus regarding this issue among the Herren der Verträge. 
 None of the available minority protection standards are uniform: 
their duality is inherent, corresponding to two levels of minority protec-
tion. This includes nondiscrimination based on belonging to a minority 
on the one hand, and minority protection per se on the other (e.g., spe-
cial rights for minorities). Not all the above standards cover both ele-
ments of such an “ideal” tandem. Although the CoE instruments allow 
talking about an inclusive approach, it is nevertheless clear that the 
nondiscrimination element of the CoE standard is better articulated, 
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being inscribed in the ECHR, than is the group-rights element. This is 
so because the latter is mostly rooted in the documents of nonbinding 
nature, such as the Framework Convention. Viewed from the perspec-
tive of this duality, also reflected in academic literature and PCIJ case 
law, the EU approach to internal minority protection is almost totally 
confined to nondiscrimination and says little on the group rights issue. 
Moving one level of governance lower, it is clear that any more or less 
uniform approach to minority protection issues among the Member 
States is missing. Group rights are de jure illegal in some Member States 
(e.g., France)268 and taken to extremes in others (e.g., Belgium).269 The 
last enlargement only added to the array of national approaches to mi-
nority protection, making it even more uncertain that the European 
Union as a whole might move in the direction of articulated suprana-
tional minority protection. 
 The picture gains complexity once one analyzes the external as-
pects of EU minority rights. Historically, the European Union has used 
a number of different approaches to minority rights in external rela-
tions and during the preparation of enlargements. In enlargement law, 
the EU path has mostly been confined to total or partial exclusion of 
the territories with minority population from the scope of application 
of Community Law. The application of such a standard, however, has 
not always been beneficial to the minorities concerned because the 
scope of their Community Law rights becomes significantly narrower 
than that of other EU citizens. Also, in respect to islands and specific 
territories or communities, the standard is hardly useful in situations in 
which minority populations are intermingled with the majority. Taken 
together, both these considerations explain the reluctance to apply 
such a standard during the preparation of the fifth enlargement. 
 This reluctance, however, did not make the pre-accession process 
easier. Having no internal minority protection tradition, the Euro-
pean Union nevertheless made minority protection one of the pre-
accession criteria to be met by the candidate countries. Claiming to 
apply a single standard in judging all applicants, which was a must in 
light of the pre-accession principle of conditionality, the European 
Union stopped short of creating a minority protection standard to be 
exported. Moreover, as this Article has explained, it even failed to ap-
ply similar standards of minority protection to all candidate countries, 
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instead applying two contradictory standards. The first standard, 
mostly rooted in CoE documents and applied in the context of the 
pre-accession assessment of the majority of the candidate countries, 
was drastically different from the second standard, which was applied 
in the context of Latvian and Estonian pre-accession progress, and 
will soon be contrary to law once the CoE benchmarks are applied. 
Defining minorities differently and adopting different approaches to 
minority self-governance, political participation, education and other 
issues, the two approaches contradict each other and hardly overlap. 
Generally speaking, one can state that while the Commission is clearly 
on the side of the minorities with respect to the first group of coun-
tries, the Commission takes the side of the candidate countries with 
respect to the second, turning a blind eye to Latvia and Estonia’s “un-
doubtedly intentional”270 policy of exclusion. 
 Such a vision of the promotion of minority protection in the can-
didate countries amounts to a disaster for the principle of condition-
ality. It demonstrates that there was no fair, merit-based assessment of 
candidate countries based on the same standards (presupposed by the 
principle). Dividing the candidate countries into two groups allows dis-
covering some standards behind this “ad-hocism and inconsistency.”271 
Still, the fact that there are at least two standards certainly plays against 
the Commission because this is precisely what the principle of condi-
tionality was supposed to avoid.272 
 The whole story of minority protection standard-setting in the 
European Union is that of numerous fictions and contradictions. The 
internal standards are weak and poorly articulated, the Member States’ 
national standards are contradictory, and the external standards are 
numerous and poorly aligned. There is little or no order in this con-
struction. 
 The current state of EU standard-setting in the field of minority 
rights has far-reaching negative implications on the development of a 
consistent system of EU minority protection in the future. A number of 
painful choices will have to be made to alter this situation. Most impor-
tantly, the European Union’s internal standard has to be made more 
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inclusive and uniform, while the European Union simply needs to cre-
ate an external standard. 
 Both developments are likely to gain importance in the near fu-
ture. After the incorporation of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, the enlarged European Union is likely to face more minority-
related problems than in the past, thus the need to effectively tackle 
them internally, both at the Member State and Community level. To 
make this work, a clear system of rules, which is missing at present, is 
indispensable. Also, to ensure smooth EU enlargement in the future, a 
uniform pre-accession minority protection standard needs to be de-
vised, which would replace the two contradictory standards employed 
during the fifth enlargement. Such a standard will be absolutely neces-
sary, given the human rights and minority protection record of the pre-
sent day candidate countries and those states hoping to submit mem-
bership applications in the future. Only when both internal and 
external standards are clearly articulated will it be possible to talk about 
a developed EU system of minority protection standards. At present, 
the European Union is only making the first tiny steps in this direction. 
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